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Introduction

The U.S.-Cuba relationship is often referred to as a relic of the Cold War. The two
countries have a long and tumultuous history. In 1959 Fidel Castro led an uprising against the
Cuban dictator, Fulgencio Batista. Upfront the United States recognized the new revolutionary
government in Cuba. However, as Cuba aligned itself with the archenemy of the United States,
the Soviet Union, relations deteriorated. When the United Stated moved to cut sugar imports
from Cuba, Castro responded by nationalizing American-owned properties in the Caribbean
country. Two years after the Cuban Revolution, and following months of confrontation, the
United States and Cuba severed diplomatic relations on January 3, 1961. Over five decades
passed before diplomatic ties were reestablished in July 2015.
In between these momentous dates a number of confrontations, negotiations, and crises
took place. Most U.S. administrations have implemented economic sanctions and isolation
toward Cuba. Few, such as the current U.S. leadership, have managed to negotiate with the
Cuban regime. Almost all U.S. governments have sought to alter the Cuban regime in some
fashion, including by reducing Soviet ties, or by overthrowing Fidel Castro. Most recently U.S.
presidents have sought to promote openness on the repressive and often isolated island. At times
Cuba has moved away from its strict socialist economy and allowed some criticism against the
government, among other reforms. But did the United States really contribute to these often
minor, albeit important openings? In analyzing U.S policy toward Cuba since 1966, and the
island’s corresponding willingness to strengthen or worsen respect for civil liberties, this thesis
will attempt to answer this question. Moreover, it will aim to decipher how successful the United
States has been in promoting liberalization in communist Cuba.
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Why Civil Liberties?
After the Cold War, the United States made incremental liberalization an important
aspect of its goals in Cuba. In addition to other objectives, the United States wanted to increase
the space for Cuban citizens to organize and speak out against the Cuban regime without facing
harassment or arbitrary detention. Until then, U.S. policy toward the country had focused mostly
on removing Fidel Castro, an ally to the Soviet Union, from power. Given this change, this paper
will seek to address how successful the United States has been in promoting openness in Cuba.
More specifically, how has U.S. policy toward Cuba affected the rights guaranteed under
liberalization, commonly referred to as civil liberties, on the island? Answering this question is
not only important for encouraging progress in Cuba, but with regard to all efforts that entail
liberalizing and democratizing authoritarian regimes as well. Understanding the effect of U.S.
policy on Cuban civil liberties could provide insight for other states attempting to promote
openness and liberalization abroad.
Additionally, this paper’s focus on civil liberties is in line with contemporary political
theory. Too often foreign policy has focused on promoting solely free and fair elections, rather
than freedoms against the state that are an integral part of full-fledged democratic societies. This
has led to an increase in what political scientist Fareed Zakaria refers to as illiberal democracies
(1997). These regimes are democratic in the sense that citizens elect their governments, yet they
fail to ensure the rule of law or civil liberties that are customary in a constitutionally liberal
society. Without these traits a democracy can be dangerous, abusive, and divided. Liberal ideas
and good governance tend to lead to stability and growth. With this in mind, Zakaria argues,
democratization efforts should also focus on promoting the rule of law and civil liberties to
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encourage peace, security, and development abroad. Ressearch focusing on civil liberties might
help to alter the tendency of governments to centralize efforts on promoting solely
democratization in autocratic regimes.
Finally, the focus on civil liberties serves this paper well in a practical sense.
Liberalization almost always precedes the attainment of democracy, whereas democracy does not
as often lead to liberalization (O’Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead 1986; Zakaria 1997).
Therefore, we can expect to see liberalization in autocratic regimes more often than we observe
democratization. This is true in the case of Cuba, where, throughout the years, there has been
more variation in terms of civil liberties than with regard to political freedoms (“Freedom in the
World Index”). Since the Cuban revolution, Cubans have gained or lost little power in choosing
their elected officials. Rights against the state, for example the ability to obtain employment in
the private sector, religious freedoms, and rights against arbitrary detention, have fluctuated
more over time.

Operationalizing Liberalization and Democratization
Addressing the differences between the terms democratization and liberalization will be
important as this project progresses. Whereas liberalization refers to the process that increases
the rights that protect an individual or group against the state, democratization involves the
greater equality of citizens with regard to their influence in governmental decision-making.
Rights guaranteed under liberalization traditionally include the right to habeas corpus and a free
trial, and the freedom of movement, speech, etc. Liberalization can refer to the state’s
involvement in the market. These rights are often referred to as civil liberties. Democratization,
at its most simplistic level, refers to the right to vote in free and fair elections. While these terms
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are often coinciding conditions in free and open societies, they are neither synonymous, nor do
they always take place together (O’Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead 1986, IV: 8-9).
Still, democracies tend to exhibit more liberal properties than other types of societies, and
very well might be dependent upon one another (Plattner 2002). As pressures for liberalization
increase so do demands for democratization (O’Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead 1986, IV:
10). So connected are the two terms that liberalization is often referred to as “the step towards
democratization” (Aknur and Okalan 2012).
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Literature Review

Liberalizing Factors
To understand why U.S. policy might cause civil liberties to improve or worsen in Cuba,
we must first identify what conditions tend to cause states to liberalize. In turn, we must answer
the following questions: What methods then can be taken to promote liberalization and civil
liberties abroad? Which methods are most effective in achieving liberalization? Why are certain
methods effective and others not? The answers to these questions are sought after in substantial
literature regarding transitions from authoritarian to democratic regimes, which constitutes a
significant portion of scholarly work in the field of international affairs.
In the groundbreaking work, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for
Democracy a group of leading scholars in the field of international affairs teamed-up to
understand the factors driving transitions toward liberalization and democracy. They tackled this
issue from both the case study and theoretical approach. According to one of its authors, Adam
Przeworksi, liberalization occurs when a regime faces internal threats to its position of power
(O’Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead 1986, III: 50). As the regime loses support within the
country it will have to: 1) offer liberalizing reforms and, or, 2) hand over power to a
democratically elected leader. Przeworski suggests that a regime will almost always prefer
liberalization if it can escape a complete transition of power. We see this tendency in autocratic
regimes today in places like Egypt, China, and several African countries, where autocrats have
instituted some reforms, but not full-fledged democratic rule (Aknur and Okalan 2012; Nasong’o
2007; Zhao 2003). Liberalization is often used to as a tool to ease internal tensions temporarily,
only to be reversed by authoritarian rulers later on.

8

Yet the central focus of Transitions From Authoritarian Rule and many other scholarly
contributions like it, is the process of democratization. In truth, scant literature focuses solely on
the issue of liberalization. Often works combine the issues of liberalization and democratization
to refer to the opening of a country and movement away from autocracy. As already established,
while the two terms are separate, they are strongly related. As liberalization progresses so do
calls for democratization (O’Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead 1986, IV: 10). To ease the
murky task of differentiating between the two terms in every occasion where they appear this
paper will treat liberalization and the process of democratization as deeply related yet distinct
topics.
Ultimately the decision to liberalize or democratize must come from pressures within the
country, except in the case that foreign intervention occurs. A major finding from the work of
O’Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead was that transitions from authoritarian rule were almost
always explained through internal factors. It is internal groups pushing for change and openness
that will cause a dictator to liberalize and or democratize. “External actors tended to play an
indirect and usually marginal role” (1986, I: 5).
While the onset and strengthening of democratic principles requires support from internal
factors, one cannot overlook the international components that contribute to democratization and
liberalization. More recent literature has discussed the importance of these external factors. In
Samuel Huntington’s 1993 work the author observes that a rise of liberalization in the late 1900s
occurred in conjunction with global pressure and growing preference for democracy. During this
time many states, including the United States and several European powers, promoted
democracy abroad. Regardless of the internal factors, Huntington found, external pressures
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contributed to the liberalization of authoritarian regimes, particularly in Asia and Eastern Europe
after the end of the Cold War.
Laurence Whitehead identifies “three international dimensions” that cause transitions to
democracy (1996). These include the proximity to democratic societies, attempts by one state to
democratize another, and the interaction between both internal and international actors. Central
to this paper will be to build an understanding of one state’s attempts to democratize or liberalize
another. Ultimately this paper seeks to find, how successful the United States has been in
promoting civil liberties in Cuba. However, seeking to determine causality between one state’s
actions and another’s response in the midst of an increasingly interconnected and complicated
global system is a complicated and difficult task. Thus, it will also be helpful to comprehend the
interconnection between internal and international actors.
Scholars have noted that since the 1970s democracy promotion has been a major focus of
U.S. foreign policy (Huntington 1996, 91-92). Attempting to liberalize them, the United States
has targeted authoritarian regimes through a variety of diplomatic, economic, and diplomatic
means. While there exist a variety of methods a state might take to promote democracy and
liberalization abroad, this study seeks to examine major foreign policies implemented by the
United States toward Cuba. These are economic sanctions, and democratic exposure techniques
including academic exchanges, migration, and exposure to pro-democracy media. However, this
paper also acknowledges the importance of internal factors and the interaction between external
and internal conditions. To control for internal factors this study will examine how domestic
economic factors might influence a state to liberalize. The research on these conditions in
relation to democratization and liberalization will be considered to frame our discussion of the
U.S. role in promoting civil liberties in Cuba.
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Sanctions
Through sanctions, it is suggested, that one state or organization, such as the UN, could
reduce economic engagement with a targeted state, thereby coercing the targeted state into
changing a policy or behavior, such as the treatment of their citizens. Following the Cold War
international, bilateral, and unilateral implementation of sanctions gained increased popularity as
a useful foreign policy tool. Since World War II, the United States has been the largest user of
sanctions (Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliot 2007, 45). While the intent behind economic sanctions
was clear, the efficacy of such practices became less obvious overtime.
A growing area of literary discourse has been concerned with the effectiveness of
economic sanctions in changing the behavior of a targeted state, including liberalizing that state.
Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliot (HSE) compiled three separate works dedicated to this issue (1990;
2000; 2007). Their analysis and the compilation of case studies provided by them frame the
groundwork of this discussion and provide the most comprehensive results regarding the
effectiveness of sanctions.
Despite being used persistently throughout recent history and today, economic sanctions
rarely achieve their intended foreign policy goal. The database created by HSE finds that of 204
cases of sanctions, only 34 percent produced their intended result. Other major contributions find
that economic sanctions are successful around one third of the time as well (Cortight and Lopez
2000).
Although they are generally ineffective, it would be rash to suggest that economic
sanctions never work. In theory, economic sanctions will be effective if the perceived economic
and political cost on the target country is larger than the political or economic cost of altering
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behavior in the way desired by the sender country. Several traits have been identified as tending
to be more economically and politically costly to a target state. Financial sanctions tend to be
more useful than simple trade sanctions, for example. Whereas trade sanctions (restrictions on
imports and exports) can be easily evaded through smuggling, financial sanctions (restrictions on
investment and other transactions) are more difficult to avoid. Moreover, financial sanctions are
easier to implement and can cause additional economic effects like a lack of foreign currency to
buy goods with (HSE 2007, 47). Shagabutinova and Berejikian advocate for the implementation
of “smart sanctions”: sanctions directed towards political elites and leaders in the target country,
rather than at the country as a whole. In their study of 115 sanctions cases they found that “smart
sanctions” were as much as 31 percent more effective than traditional trade sanctions (2007).
Several other factors tend to produce positive results. Sanctions are more successful if
they are implemented in a multilateral fashion or with support from international organizations.
Conversely the effects of sanctions can be offset if the targeted state has international support or
economic backing from other countries or organizations of its own. Moreover, the impact of
sanctions will be strengthened if the target state is weak economically (HSE 2007, 51). Finally,
economic sanctions will be rarely effective if the sender country’s demands are very ambitious.
For example, if the sender country demand that a totalitarian regime step down and hold
democratic elections, it is very unlikely that the target country will acquiesce (HSE 2007, 54).
Certain circumstances economic sanctions might particularly be influential in altering the
human rights conditions on the targeted state. Given this paper’s focus on civil liberties, it is
important to note these relationships. Cortright and Lopez find that economic sanctions can
severely harm vulnerable populations in targeted countries. That is, the economic suffering
caused by sanctions can deprive groups in the target state of basic human rights like access to
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food and other goods. Thus, some of the very sanctions that set out to improve human rights
conditions actually worsen those conditions in the targeted country.
Finally, economic sanctions might backfire and go against the humanitarian intentions of
the sender country by strengthening the target country regime and incentivizing repression in the
target country. As a result of unfavorable economic and social conditions produced by sanctions,
the opposition in the target country often mobilizes against the existing regime and demands
change. The governing party perceives this as a threat to its position of power and responds with
increased repression. Indirectly, the sending country has caused “sanctions-induced repression”
(Wood 2008). Sanctions may also produce a “rally around the flag” effect. An autocrat is
enabled to reinforce their claims to legitimacy by ridiculing the sender country or organization,
and thereby heightening nationalism. This might strengthen the regimes ability to permit
repression against political dissidents (Peksen 2007).
While the consensus is that sanctions are ineffective in producing widespread
democratization and liberalization nationwide, some scholars point to important factors that can
contribute to positive results. Such sanctions might avoid creating the unfavorable conditions
resulting from “sanctions-induced repression” and “rally around the flag”.

Sanctions Hypothesis List

Hypothesis 1: economic sanctions will fail to bring about liberalization in a target state (HSE
2007).
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Hypothesis 2: if economic sanctions are implemented with the support of international
organizations or other countries, then sanctions will be more likely to bring about liberalization
in the target state (HSE 2007)

Democratic Exposure
International exposure to democracy is another technique utilized in attempt to liberalize
authoritarian regimes. Support of democracy exposure techniques are largely based upon the
theoretical idea set forth by Levinksy and Way, and other scholars, who posit that increased ties
to democratic ideology will enlighten “domestic constituencies with a stake in adhering to
democratic norms and strengthening democratic forces in relation to autocrats” (2005). This
proposition is supported by several studies following the Cold War, which found that the
likelihood of democratization and heightened exposure to democratic ideals were tightly linked
(Diamond 2003; Kopstein and Reilly 2000; Richmond 2010;).

Educational Exchange
Educational exchange programs are commonly implemented by democratic states for the
purpose of promoting liberalization abroad. The United States, for example, engages in various
educational exchanges with students from autocratic states to promote democratic ideas. For one,
it is generally agreed that increased levels of education promote democracy (Sanborn and Thyne
2014). Additionally, such an experience should provide the important linkages to democratic
ideas discussed by Levinksy and Way. Nye contests that U.S. programs remain highly effective
in spreading democratic ideology because “many of these former students eventually wind up in
positions where they can affect policy outcomes” (2004). Educational exchanges, particularly
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those with the United States, tend to directly affect some of the brightest young citizens traveling
from autocratic regimes. One such example is Soviet political scientist Aleksandr Yakovlev, who
studied at Columbia University in his youth. Yakovlev was an extremely influential figure in
promoting the liberalization of the Soviet regime.
Nye’s claims are backed up in various quantitative research studies. For example, in a
study of 160 countries spanning the years 1972-2000, Atkinson finds that, of various potentially
liberalizing factors, the presence of U.S. military educational exchanges served as the strongest
determinant of liberalization in autocratic regimes (2006). Countries whose military soldiers
study in U.S. military academies tend to liberalize sometime afterward. Atkinson further
investigates the effects of educational exchange programs on autocratic regimes in a later study,
which determined that a country’s participation in a U.S. civilian or military exchange is
positively correlated with future improvements in human rights conditions (2010).

Migration
Migration to a democratic country is another form of democratic exposure, which, while
less robust in scholarship, is regarded as an effective means for the dissemination of democratic
ideals. Most studies concerning migration and democracy promotion deal with Latin American
immigration to the United States (Levitt 1998), and in particular Mexican migration to the
United States (Perez-Armendariz and Crow 2010; De la Garza, and Yetim 2003). De la Garza
and Yetim find that Mexican immigrants display higher appreciation for democratic ideals than
their Mexican counterparts as a result of socialization (2003). It argues against those who argue
that cultural values are rigid, and instead argues that it can be altered, through democratic
exposure, for example. This increased commitment to democratic values is directly in line with
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the theory of international linkage and democratization put forth by Levitsky and Way. PerezArmendariz and Crow also observes an increase in democratic ideals of Mexican immigrants to
the United States, but further contributes to the debate by considering the effect immigration has
on non-migrants living in Mexico (2010). They determine that non-migrants, particularly those
with relatives living in the United States, frequently experience heightened appreciation of
democratic values due to direct exchange with returning migrant family members, remittances,
and informational channels. These connections promote democratic diffusion and democratic
principles are strengthened in the home country.

Pro-democracy Media
Exposure to Western or pro-democracy media has been shown to promote democratic
values among those living in autocratic regimes. The role of the media as a democratization
promoter became an area of study following the Cold War. It is generally agreed that Western
media observed in the U.S.S.R. during the Cold War was an important contributor to promoting
liberalization in Soviet Russia (Parta 2007; Nye 2004; Richmond 2010). Parta offered some of
the strongest statistical evidence of that claim, in a study which utilized more than 50,000
interviews of Soviet citizens to determine that information from Western broadcasts were in fact
critical in forming democratic attitudes in the USSR, and the eventual liberalization of the
country (2010). However, the generalization that exposure to western media often produces
liberal attitudes may be over reliant on the Soviet case (Kern and Hainmueller 2009). In Eastern
Germany during Soviet occupation, for example, it was observed that those who were exposed to
West German television, which often promoted democratic ideas and portrayed East Germany in
a negative way, actually displayed an increase in support for the East German regime (Kern and
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Hainmueller 2009). Still, it appears that general exposure to democratic media sources tends to
reduce support for authoritarian regimes and promote democratic ideas. Such tendencies have
been observed to in other regions of the world, such as Brazil (Stein 2012).

Democracy Exposure Hypothesis List

Hypothesis 1: if exposure to democratic ideas increases in an autocratic regime, through
academic exchange, migration, or exposure to Western Media, then pressures for liberalization
will increase and a regime will liberalize (Levinsky and Way 2005; Nye 2004; Perez-Armendariz
and Crow 2010; Parta 2007).

Domestic Economic Conditions
In 1959 Lipset established the modernization theory, which argues that economic
development spurs democracy. The various social advancements in urbanization, wealth, and
education that accompany economic development, he argues, are “requisites of democracy”. It
provides us with an understanding of the domestic elements that may spur democratization
(Lipset 1959). Lipet’s modernization theory (which he credits Aristotle with) has been confirmed
in various subsequent studies (Acemoglu, Robinson and Yared 2005; Burkhart and Lewis-Beck
1994; Bollen and Jackman 1985; Barro 1999). These analyses, however, have provided a more
comprehensive and nuanced approach to Lipset’s theory. Still, some arguments have been made
in opposition to Lipset’s proposition (Przeworski et al. 1997; Przeworski et al. 2000).
Bollen and Jackman found strong evidence to support the notion that economic
development increases the likelihood of democratization (1985). Barro utilized a more
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comprehensive set of data from 1960 to 1995 to further support the positive effect that economic
indicators, including high GDP per capita and primary school attendance, have on
democratization (1999). Other studies have confirmed Lipset’s proposition that education leads
to liberalization as well (Barro 1999; Glaeser et al. 2004). Overall, there is consensus that
supports Lipset notion that economic development, which promotes educational advancement
and “modernization”, leads to democratization.
It is not just the development of the economy over time, however, that seems to affect
democratization. In their collective work O’Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead stress the
importance of the relationship between present economic conditions and democratization (1986).
Where economic conditions are positive, internal pressures for regime change will be low. Other
studies, influenced by Lipset’s theory, have focused on the interaction between socioeconomic
classes, economic conditions, and pressures for democratization. In Acemoglu, Robinson, and
Yared democratization and liberalization are shown to be dependent on both the presence of
inequality and the state of economic conditions (2005). If inequality is high, then the poor in that
society will collectivize and pressure the governing autocratic regime to democratize (2004).
Moreover, these authors find that during an economic crisis or recession internal opposition will
be high and democratization is more likely to take place.
Despite strong support for the modernization theory, some contributions have argued
against its premise. Przeworki et al. point to Lipset’s and others’ simplistic approach to the issue
of modernization. They argue that modernization theory fails to prove that economic
development leads to democratization. Przeworki et al. argue, rather, that economic development
is simply correlated with democracy because the former works to strengthen the latter (1997;
2000). Economic development should prevent a democratic regime from falling into a
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totalitarian state, but does not enable an authoritarian regime to democratize. However, using the
same data as Przeworki, Boix and Stokes prove that economic development does increase the
chance that democratization will occur (2003). Still, that study agrees that economic
development can help sustain a democracy, a nuance that Lipset’s theory did not originally
consider.

Domestic Economic Conditions Hypothesis List

Hypothesis 1: If economic conditions are poor, then an autocratic regime will face more
pressure for change and liberalize (Lipset.1959; Acemoglu, Robinson and Yared 2005)
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Methods

This thesis will use a case-study approach to draw connections between variations in civil
liberties in Cuba and changes in U.S. policy toward the island. It will separate the period from
1966 to present into three different time periods: 1966-1981, 1981-1991, and 1991-present.
These time periods are broken down based on fluctuations in civil liberties in Cuba. At the end of
each period we observe a change in the numerical civil liberties score and qualitative analysis
provided by Freedom House. During the period 1966 to 1981 we observe an improvement in
civil liberties. From 1981 to 1991 we see a worsening of conditions. Finally, in the time frame of
1991 to present an improvement in civil liberties once again takes place.
The time periods are also formed based on changes in U.S. policy over time. From 1966
to 1981 policies implemented toward Cuba were focused on promoting migration and
cooperation with the Cuban regime. In the period 1981 to 1991 policy is predominantly aimed
toward isolating Cuba and promoting access to democratic information among Cubans. In the
post-Cold War era from 1991 to present policies attempted, at first to strengthen economic
pressure against Cuba, and most recently to heighten cooperation as in the 1970s. Changes within
each time period are common, and important, and will be addressed throughout. This mixed
approach of considering both changes in U.S. foreign policy and changes in our dependent
variable, liberalization, allows us to examine how fluctuations in policy between eras tend to
affect liberalization trends in Cuba.
This thesis’ analysis begins in 1966 because that is when the United States ended overt
and covert attempts to topple the Cuban regime. By focusing on trends after 1966 we offer an
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analysis of how one country might influence an established, autocratic regime to liberalize.
Moreover, data on the conditions of civil liberties in Cuba during the early 1960s is scant.
To measure the level of liberalization and civil liberties in Cuba this study will utilize
data and qualitative summaries provided by Freedom House, a Washington D.C.-based
organization, which observes and analyzes human rights, and supports efforts to promote
democracy and freedom abroad. Freedom House’s first assessment of freedom began in the
1950s. The Balance Sheet of Freedom offered broad analysis of the level of individual freedom
in the world. However, it lacked substantial qualitative assessment included in the reports today.
Since then Freedom House has thoroughly advanced its analysis. In 1974 it began providing
scores for civil liberties and political freedoms worldwide. In 1978 scholar Raymond Gastil
produced the first Freedom in the World report, a comprehensive analysis on the situation of
freedom throughout the globe. Beginning in 1989 a group of leading scholars contributed to the
annual report. Today the Freedom project is a massive and in-depth report that requires the
assistance of regional and academic analysts (“Freedom in the World 2015 Methodology” 2015).
Every year Freedom in the World provides a score for the level of political rights and
civil liberties within each country during the previous year. Each score range from 1, most free,
to 7, least free. Countries with a score of 7 on civil liberties, for example, have few or no civil
liberties. In 1978 the annual reports produced by Gastil and a set of advisors was expanded to
include summary discussions of the facts and events that helped determine the ratings provided
for each country. In 2015 the assessment was produced by a team of 30 advisers and 60 analysts,
who use “a broad range of sources” to produce the scores for each country. The ratings for
political rights and civil liberties are based on sets of 10 and 15 questions, respectively, that are
indicators of those freedoms (“Freedom in the World 2015 Methodology” 2015). Freedom
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House claims that only “modest changes” have been made over the years and that changes are
made incrementally so that ratings are comparable overtime. Admittedly, a time-series analysis
based on the Freedom in the World report will be affected by the changes in methodology and
differing levels of subjectivity over the years.
Since this thesis’ focus is on civil liberty conditions in Cuba, it will draw on the scores
(provided since 1974) and the qualitative summaries (offered since 1978). Thus, from the time
period 1966-1976 and particularly from 1966 to 1974, other sources were required to gain insight
about the situation of civil liberties in Cuba. These include human rights reports produced by the
Organization of American States (OAS) and other relevant assessments. For the historical
analysis of U.S. policies toward Cuba this thesis uses secondary historical documents related to
U.S.-Cuba relations, the U.S. embargo, and other relevant topics. Leading experts in the field of
U.S.-Cuba relations produced all of the works used.
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Historical Background

On January 1, 1959 Fidel Castro and other revolutionary leaders overthrew Cuban
President Fulgenico Batista. In the following months during the first few years of the new
regime, Castro’s revolutionary government implemented various reforms intended to reduce U.S.
influence in the country and to create a more egalitarian society based on the principles of
communism. Not only did the revolution require changes to its internal society that diminished
hierarchical structures, it mandated that the relationship with the United States, which was based
on a balance of power that the United States dominated, be redefined. Cuba reduced imports
from the United States, nationalized American assets in the country, and provided zero monetary
compensation to the thousands of business owners who had their investments expropriated.
Rebalancing the U.S.-Cuba relationship also meant that Cuba had to align itself with U.S.
enemies, namely the Soviet Union. With every instance of confrontation the Cuba-Soviet Union
relationship was strengthened. Following the discontinuation of the Cuban Sugar Quota by U.S.
President Dwight D. Eisenhower, for example, Cuba and the Soviet Union entered into a variety
of economic agreements.
The U.S.-Cuba relationship quickly moved toward complete isolation in 1960 and 1961.
In October of 1960 the United States initiated an economic embargo against Cuba. The
Caribbean country responded by nationalizing the remaining American enterprises on the island.
In January 1961 the United States and Cuba severed diplomatic relations when they closed their
respective embassies (Perez 2003, 238-244). The stage was set for a long era of antagonism and
confrontation.
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As Cuba aligned itself with the Soviet Union and attempted to reduce U.S. influence on
the island, the United States moved equally fast to remove Cuba’s leaders from power. Over the
next five or so years, the United States implemented several attempts to overthrow Fidel Castro
and his supporters. The most famous attempt was the failed Bay of Pigs invasion organized by
the Central Intelligence Agency in April 1961. Following the Bay of Pigs operation, formally
known as Operation Zapata, the CIA looked for alternative subversive strategies to topple the
Cuban regime. From 1960-1965 the US attempted to assassinate Castro at least eight different
times (Husain, 27). The CIA also intended to implement a comprehensive plan of covert activity
in Cuba, Operation Mongoose. The initiative included a variety of approaches to promoting
dissent within the country, including coordinating with churches and labor groups in Cuba, and
carrying out economic warfare. Cuban exiles were also trained in Florida and propaganda was
distributed to the island via balloons. This operation intended to build a counterrevolutionary
movement in Cuba that would topple the Communist regime. After years of intelligence
gathering, failed attempts to overthrow the regime, and the Cuban Missile crisis in the fall of
1962, Operation Mongoose was officially discontinued in January 1963 (Husain 2005, 27-42)
While this initial time frame of confrontation sets the stage for decades to come, this paper will
focus on the period after foreign intervention attempts, from 1966 to present day. By beginning
the analysis in 1966, the focus throughout will be on efforts to get an established, autocratic
regime to liberalize.
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Chapter I: Encouraging Cooperation and Migration (1966-1981)

Overview
The end of the Kennedy administration marked the conclusion of U.S. efforts to topple
the Castro regime directly through mainly interventionist means. In subsequent years various
tactics would be taken to weaken Castro’s regime, to reduce Cuba-Soviet interaction, and to
encourage human rights on the island. However, rarely did these approaches entail the support of
guerrilla groups or other clandestine means of promoting Cuban destabilization. Still, some of
the policies implemented toward Cuba under President Kennedy and in the first half of the
Johnson administration were left intact. The Nixon administration for example did little to alter
economic sanctions originally implemented under President Eisenhower. The Ford and Carter
administrations altered U.S. policy toward Cuba by implementing a somewhat more conciliatory
approach in which resolve was combined with an effort to negotiate via a carrot-and-stick
approach. Under these administrations sanctions were eased, and opportunities for travel and
migration were heightened. President Carter was particularly interested in increasing U.S.-Cuba
cooperation. Under the Carter administration Cuba and the United States opened Interests
Sections, allowed for the visits of congressional leaders, and signed a maritime and fishing
agreement, among other peacemaking actions.
Near the end of this time frame we observe an improvement in civil liberties according to
Freedom in the World. In 1977 Freedom House upgrades Cuba’s civil liberty rating from a 7 to a
6, based on the freeing of thousands of political prisoners and allowing Cuban exiles in the
United States to visit their families in Cuba. At first glance, Ford and Carter’s conciliatory
approach appeared to have a positive, yet minor effect on liberalization in Cuba. In this section
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we will examine a series of conditions that might affect civil liberties to try to determine what
factors played the most important role in the slight liberalization observed in the late 1970s.

Civil liberties
Freedom House began providing global scores for civil liberties and political freedoms in
1973. From that year, until 1976 Cuba received the lowest grade possible, a 7, on civil liberties.
While Freedom House provides no qualitative summaries during this time period, other sources
confirm the abysmal human rights conditions on the island… State media was strongly
controlled throughout this era. Political opponents were discriminated against and those
unwilling to renounce their opposition were held in harsh conditions. Furthermore freedom of
religion and choice of workplace, education, or residence were absent. Torture was reported as
well (Gastil 1977; Gastil 1978).
In 1977 the Freedom in the World Reports upgraded Cuba’s civil liberty score to 6.
Throughout the remainder of the 70s Cuba’s scores remained at that level. The corresponding
qualitative reports indicate improvements, albeit minor ones, with regard to the respect for civil
liberties in Cuba during this time period. The most significant opening occurred in 1978 when
the Cuban regime began to release thousands of political prisoners and exiles to the United
States. Castro also allowed exiles to visit their families on the island for the first time since the
revolution. Some freedom to criticize the government informally was established, however
writing, even privately, against the government could result in severe punishment (Gastil 1981,
339).

Sanctions
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A Slight Relaxation
Under the Johnson and Nixon administrations economic policy toward Cuba was largely
unchanged. The full-scale embargo instituted under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 was
maintained, as well as cut backs to the sugar quota originally instituted by the Eisenhower
administration. Regional economic isolation did increase under the Johnson administration in
1964 when the OAS passed, with U.S. support, an agreement to institute a regional embargo
against Cuba, and in 1967 when the OAS instituted even more economic restrictions (Kaplowitz
1998, 67). Despite this initial success, the United States largely was unsuccessful in making the
embargo multilateral worldwide. The OAS was the only international organization to ever adopt
economic sanctions against Cuba. The regional sanctions only existed for a mere ten years,
probably not long enough to make a lasting impact. Moreover, even when the regional policy
was in place, several OAS members refused to comply (Kaplowitz 1998, 78). The United States’
inability to make the economic embargo multilateral was costly, in both an economic and
political sense. As Latin American states reinstating trading and diplomatic relations with the
island, the effect of the embargo dwindled and the United States appeared isolated in its policy
toward Cuba. The exceptional nature of U.S. policy was even more visible when compared with
the stance taken outside of the Americas where governments of various political and economic
orientations maintained diplomatic and economic relations with Cuba.
As some countries in the region began reinstating relations with Cuba in the mid 1970s
and other voices criticized the embargo, U.S. intransigence on the economic embargo began to
dwindle. During President Gerald Ford’s time in office the United States made its first
significant reversals in its economic approach toward Cuba. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger
authorized secret meetings with Cuba in 1975 and sought to relax the hostile relationship that
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existed between the two countries. These discussions included talk of easing the embargo.
Although they were cut short in 1975 when Cuba deployed soldiers to Angola to bolster Marxist
rebels fighting in that country, these meetings resulted in several achievements. The United
States moved to allow foreign subsidiaries to interact with Cuba and to authorize ships doing
business with Cuba to refuel at U.S. ports. President Ford also revoked the foreign aid
penalizations that were imposed upon foreign countries trading with Cuba (Perez-Stable 2011,
12). Finally, the Ford administration helped reduce regional isolation of Cuba with its support of
a 1975 OAS resolution that revoked the hemispheric sanctions against Cuba implemented under
President Johnson (Haney 2004, 26; Kaplowitz 1998, 86; Perez-Stable 2011, 12).
Despite Cuba’s involvement in the Angolan conflict, the Carter administration quietly
continued efforts to improve economic relations. After just two months into his presidency,
Carter ordered the State Department to revoke existing restrictions on travel to Cuba. Following
this announcement, Americans were able to visit Cuba and purchase goods with dollars while
there. In June 1977 the Carter Administration further reduced economic restraints by
discontinuing the practice of “blacklisting” foreign vessels that traded with Cuba (Kaplowitz
1998, 95). A serious congressional initiative was undertaken to further repeal the embargo as
well in 1977 when South Dakota Senator George McGovern introduced a bill to allow Cuba to
import food and medicine. Although McGovern’s and several others’ attempts to repeal the
embargo failed they symbolized an interest in changing policy with the Cuban regime.
Efforts to derail the embargo and to further increase cooperation with Cuba gained
momentum until 1978 when Cuba became involved in a proxy war in Ethiopia. This
reinvigorated earlier concerns about Cuba’s willingness to export communist revolution and
derailed the prospect of openly normalizing relations with Cuba. Additionally problematic was
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that U.S. intelligence discovered a Soviet military base in Cuba in 1979. With a reelection
looming and Carter administration appearing to be increasing “soft” on Cuba and the Soviet
Union, economic relaxation toward the island became increasingly difficult to endorse (Haney
2004, 28-30; Kaplowitz 1998, 101-102).
Although they were cut short, Carter’s conciliatory efforts produced positive results.
Most importantly this approach persuaded Castro to come to the negotiating table and to alter the
way Cuba treated its political dissidents. Since the severing of diplomatic ties in 1961, Fidel
Castro has made normalizing relations with the United States conditional on the removal of the
U.S. embargo. Carter’s relaxation of sanctions, however moderate it might have been, showed
Castro that he was serious about negotiating a path towards normalization. Moreover, it
displayed to Castro that Carter’s foreign policy was not solely based in hostility, as many of his
predecessors’ had been.
Carter also relaxed economic policy toward Cuba in terms of the goals he aimed to
accomplish through that policy. Rather than hoping to oust Castro from power, as many of his
successors had, Carter focused on the limited objective of improving human rights on the island.
Nor did the Carter administration aim to alter Cuba’s foreign policy. Even when Cuba continued
its involvement in Angola, the U.S. moved to relax the embargo. As Cuba sent troops into
Ethiopia, those policies remained in place, despite political pressure within and outside Carter’s
cabinet to reverse them (Kaplowitz 1998, 100). Economic sanctions tend to be ineffective if the
sender country’s demands are overly ambitious (Hufbauer, Schott, Elliot 2007). Carter’s
moderate goal of improving human rights conditions in Cuba is in line with this tendency. After
a 1978 dialogue between Cuban exiles and the Cuban government, which was facilitated by the
United States, the island announced the release of more than 3,000 political prisoners. It also
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permitted the occasional return to the island of Cuban exiles, who had been previously been
forbidden from visiting family members in Cuba (Gastil 1978; Kaplowitz 1998, 102). These
might not be significant alterations in Cuban policy, however they reveal real change that was a
direct result of Carter’s pragmatism.

Democratic Exposure
Heightened Migration
Cuban migration to the United States increased significantly after the 1959 Cuban
Revolution as dissidents were marginalized and offered little opportunity for political expression.
In particular Cuba’s elite, disenchanted by the nationalization of industries and various
communist economic reforms, left Cuba in large numbers (Pedraza 1996, 312). Furthermore,
immigrant assistance programs such as the Cuban Refugee Emergency Center, established in
1960, incentivized migration to the United States. More than 170,000 Cubans immigrated to the
United States from 1960 to 1964. This program along with a variety of other state and municipal
level initiatives provided subsidized educational, professional, language and other forms of
training to Cuban immigrants (Perez 2003, 254).
Following the October 1962 missile crisis the United States actually restricted migration,
although only temporarily. Amidst migration pressures Fidel Castro announced in 1965 that
those with family in the United States could leave Cuba at the port of Camarioca. President
Johnson shortly thereafter declared that those seeking refuge in the United States would be
welcome. Relatives of exiles picked up thousands of Cubans, who were brought safely back to
Miami, Florida. After a month of these boatlifts, “Freedom Flights” were initiated between the
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United States and Cuba. From 1965 to 1973 airlifts facilitated the transportation of more than
250,000 Cubans to the United States (Perez-Stable 2011, 16; Gibbs 2011, 18).
Moreover immigration was augmented in 1966 when President Lyndon B. Johnson
signed into law the Cuban Adjustment Act (CAA). The CAA granted an alleviated pathway to
residency for Cuban citizens admitted to the United States. The law offered legal permanent
residency to any Cuban who lived in the United States for at least two years and arrived after
January 1, 1959, the date of the Cuban Revolution (Arteaga 2008, 210). Thus, the CAA made
Cuban immigrants exempt from traditional restrictions of immigration that apply to most other
nationalities seeking residency status in the United States. The CAA also eased the naturalization
process for Cuban immigrants. Cuban migrants could now apply for citizenship after staying
only two and a half years in the United States rather than five (Gibbs 2011, 18; Pedraza 1996).
The attraction of an eased path to residency and citizenship prompted thousands of Cubans to
migrate to the United States, regardless of how dangerous the 90-mile journey might have been.

An Abrupt Halt
In 1973 Fidel Castro abruptly ended migration flows when he announced that Cubans
seeking refuge in the United States would no longer be able to leave the country. From 1973 to
1979 less than 50,000 Cubans migrated to the United States. Interaction between Americans and
Cubans continued, although through touristic rather than migratory means. Within two months of
his inauguration, Carter removed the U.S. ban on travel to Cuba. Shortly after that, in September
1977, the Carter administration opened an Interest Section in Cuba (Perez 2003, 256; PerezStable 2011, 13). After talks between Cuban exiles and the Cuban government, which were
facilitated by the United States, Castro agreed to allow family visits to the island in 1978. The
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United States also accepted thousands of political prisoners and their families. In the subsequent
year 100,000 Cuban Americans with family members on the island and tens of thousands of
Americans would visit Cuba (Perez-Stable 2011, 20; Perez 2003, 256).
Family members and American tourists flooded Cuban cities with dollars and U.S.
consumer goods. The presence of material goods, along with stories of wealth, surely provoked
an interest about the economic opportunities America might provide. As a result of these desires
a mass migration from the island took place. The Mariel Crisis began in the spring of 1980 when
a group of thousands demanded asylum at the Peruvian embassy in Havana. In order to prevent a
potential crisis, Castro announced that Cubans could once again leave the island. This time
Cubans were free to leave via the Mariel Port provided they had someone to pick them up.
Hundreds of Cuban Americans arrived on boat at the Mariel Port and transferred family
members and others to Miami. Within just a few months 125,000 Cubans chaotically fled to the
United States via boatlifts (Perez 2003, 256-257).

The Mariel Crisis
The Mariel Crisis signified an end to this period of mass migration. Although evidence
shows that the great majority of Marielitos were mainstream Cuban workers seeking economic
opportunity, the American press highlighted the fact that a small percentage of these Cubans
were criminals. The subsequent public outcry was problematic for the continuation of the proimmigration policies implemented under President Carter (Pedraza 1996). The Mariel boatlifts
were ended in October 1980 on mutual terms between the Cuban and American governments.
During the late 1960s and the early 1970s exchanges between Cuban and American
officials increased, albeit slightly. A series of high-level diplomatic visits occurred during the
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70s. This included visits from Senators Jacob Javits and Claiborn Pell, the first visits by U.S.
elected officials to Cuba since the severing of relations in 1961. In the summer of 1974 President
Ford liberalized U.S. travel provisions by allowing scholars and journalists to travel to Cuba with
the issuing of special licenses. U.S. presidential candidate George McGovern and Senator James
Abourezk also visited Cuba in 1977 and met with officials from the University of Havana
(Kaplowitz 1998, 89; Martínez.and Resende 2006, 32).
In particular Carter sought to increase contact between average Cuban and American
citizens. Within two months of his inauguration President Carter lifted the travel ban to Cuba.
Carter and Castro further facilitated interaction between the two countries with the opening of
Interests Sections in September 1977. This was integral in supporting travel between the two
countries. The major exchanges in academics occurred under the Carter administration occurred
in October 1977 when Cuban academics visited U.S. campuses including Johns Hopkins and
Yale University. In 1979 a group of American academics from Johns Hopkins visited the
University of Havana. The 1979 trip initiated an annual exchange between the two universities
that continued at least until 2006. These constitute just a few examples of several academic
exchanges that occurred between Cuban and American academics during the Carter
administration (Martínez and Resende 2006, 34).
Despite the massive exodus of Cubans to the United States following the Revolution and
throughout the early 1970s, migration did little to encourage exchanges of democratic ideas
between Cubans and their expatriates. Migration to the United States represented a complete
separation from the island, and family members and friends that remained in Cuba. Cuban policy
required that those leaving the island could never return. The regime viewed exiles as traitors.
Castro himself referred to exiles with hostility, labeling them gusanos, or worms (Barberia
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2002). While migrants living in the United States surely were exposed to democratic ideas, the
same cannot be said about their Cuban family members or friends remaining in Cuba. Finally,
potential exchanges were limited due to U.S. policy as well. Throughout the early 60s and late
70s exchanges between scholars, officials, and statesmen were limited. Thus, sufficient exposure
to democratic ideas to promote pressures for liberalization did not take place in the late 60s and
early to mid-70s.
With the authorization of family visits in 1978 one might expect significant crossnational exchanges to take place. There is significant evidence that they did. More than 100,000
Cuban Americans visited the island in 1979 alone. Moreover, through their contacts with Cuban
American family members, Cubans developed an interest in the market-oriented opportunities
the United States had to offer. The mass protests and pressures for migration prior to the Mariel
Crisis evidence these desires for economic freedom. Rather than liberalize Cuba’s economic
policy, Castro had a much simpler solution to the growing interest in economic opportunity. He
allowed and encouraged those interested in the “American dream” to depart from the island. By
encouraging the exodus of the opposition and by heightening the nationalistic rhetoric against
those dissidents, mass immigration actually strengthened Castro’s claims to rule in Cuba and
diminished the likelihood of liberalization. Therefore, it is unlikely that the uptick in civil
liberties was caused by the coincidental and corresponding increase in cultural exchanges.

Domestic Economic Factors
Strength from Soviet Aid
The embargo did little to debilitate the Cuban economy from the mid-60s to the late 70s.
Although U.S. imports accounted for a large portion of Cuban trade prior to the implementation
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of sanctions, Cuba was able to circumvent the policy by increasing trade elsewhere. This
primarily meant heightening economic relations with countries of the socialist bloc, and in
particular the Soviet Union. During the period 1961 to 1973 socialist bloc countries accounted
for 73 percent of Cuba’s total trade (Kaplowitz 1998, 77). These countries were often inclined to
provide Cuba cheap credit, and pay higher prices for Cuban goods, such as sugar, to support a
fellow socialist country in the western hemisphere, who persistently faced opposition from the
United States. In some ways Cuba did not only offset the U.S. embargo, but also further
advanced its economy after the implementation of economic sanctions.
In particular Cuba benefited from the support of the Soviet Union. The Soviets provided
an estimated 1 million dollars per day in assistance to the island throughout the 1970s (Perez
2003, 259). From 1961 to 1985 Cuba received more than 40 billion dollars in aid from the Soviet
Union. Trade between the two socialist countries prospered as well. The Soviet Union accounted
for nearly 50 percent of Cuba’s total trade, more than any other trading partner (Kaplowitz 1998,
77). Finally the island offset U.S. sanctions through improved relations with fellow Latin
American and Caribbean states. Argentina, Barbados, Colombia, Guyana, Jamaica, Trinidad and
Tobago, and Venezuela normalized relations with Cuba in the 1970s after more than a decade of
diplomatic freezes. In 1975 the OAS, with support from the United States representative, ended
multilateral sanctions that had been in place for more than a decade (Perez-Stable 2011, 11;
Gibbs 2011). Trade between Cuba and these Latin American states would prosper throughout the
decade.
Improved relations with the United States in the latter years of the 1970s also had
positive effects on the Cuban economy. The introduction of family visits and the authorization of
American travel to Cuba in 1977 was particularly beneficial. Returning exiles spent over 100
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million dollars in Cuba from 1979 to 1980. Most of this activity occurred at governmentsponsored stores where visitors could purchase goods for their Cuban families (Perez 2003, 256).
In economic terms the Cuban economy grew significantly during this period. From 1966
to 1970 the Cuba’s gross national product (GNP) developed at a 3.9 percent annually. From 1970
to 1980 the Cuban economy grew at a rate of 10 percent (Morales and Provost 2008, 89). Living
standards were strong as well. The economy was often running at full employment, and many
Cubans were enrolled in formal education. Access to healthcare, which was provided free from
the government, was high.
Near the end of the 1970s Cuba’s economy underwent a minor decline. Growth dropped
from 9.4 percent in 1978 to 4.3 percent in 1979. In a speech to Cuba’s congress Castro discussed
the economic decline. Of several issues, Cuba faced high energy costs and shortages of goods.
Castro also spoke of a lack of sugar production due to sugar rust disease that had affected the
industry (Kaplowitz 1998, 105). While the Cuban economy prospered in the late 60s and
throughout the 1970s, it was headed for a sharp decline in the decade ahead.
Economic pressures on the Castro regime during the mid 1960s and throughout the 1970s
could be characterized as low. The prosperity of the Cuban economy, and Cuba’s ability to offset
sanctions through heightened trade with Latin America, Europe, and the socialist bloc in
particular, limited the influence of the United States’ economic embargo. Moreover, internal
pressures for reform were limited. Cuban living conditions were positive, and thus, they saw
little benefit to changing the Cuban socialist system. Improved economic prosperity also gave
Castro and the Cuban leadership political strength. Cuban growth in the face of U.S. isolationism
made Cuba appear invulnerable to U.S. sanctions and hostility. Despite U.S. condemnation,
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Cuba maintained troops in Angola and entered the war in Ethiopia. There is little evidence to
show that Cuba’s limited openness in the late 1970s was a result of economic conditions.
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Chapter II: Hostile Diplomacy and Radio Martí (1981-1991)

Overview
U.S. policy toward Cuba during the 1980s was sharply contrasted from the conciliatory
approach initiated under President Ford and heightened under President Carter. The Reagan
administration instituted a hostile approach to Cuba that was left intact by his successor George
H.W. Bush. Generally both administrations viewed Latin America’s problems, particularly the
various civil wars taking place in Central America, as direct results of Cuba’s influence in the
region. This perspective resulted in attempts to reverse diplomatic interactions with Cuba and to
heighten anti-Castro rhetoric. In this regard exposure to democracy was diminished. Although
these administrations supported pro-democracy propaganda programs such as Radio Martí, the
impact of this and the subsequent TV Martí initiative have been viewed as limited.
Reagan’s hardline approach was slightly relaxed for a short period of time in the latter
years of his administration. The reinstatement of an immigration agreement that coordinated the
return of Mariel undesirables to Cuba and facilitated the immigration of Cuban exiles to the
United States indicated a more pacifying approach. Positive engagement continued in 1988 when
Cuba agreed to remove troops from Angola under a tripartite accord that was facilitated by the
United States. Despite this signaling of a potential turning point in U.S.-Cuban relations, the
hostile approach established under the majority of the Reagan years continued in the first half of
the Bush administration.

Civil liberties
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The civil liberties scores awarded to Cuba from 1981 to 1989 are 6. Cuba’s willingness to
release political prisoners into exile in 1978 translated into a limited toleration for political
dissidents, particularly those willing to admit to wrongdoing. Additional openings took place in
1984, when the right to private property and freedom to practice religion were improved through
constitutional amendment (Gastil 1985, 286). In 1988, for example, the United Nations Human
Rights Commission and several other international organizations were allowed to visit Cuba to
meet with human rights activists. The Red Cross was permitted to visit a number of Cuban
prisoners. In that same year Fidel Castro admitted to holding political dissidents in jail, several of
who were later released (Gastil 1990, 134). In 1990 Castro announced that religious believers
would be authorized to participate in the communist system.
Yet these slight openings reflect more of a symbolic movement rather than a true
deepening of the liberalization of the late 1970s The limited impact of the above actions is
reflected in the consistency of civil liberty scores during the 1980s. Overall conditions remained
highly repressive. Those identifying as part of the political opposition were often discriminated
against or imprisoned for their activities. When opposition members did not recant on their
political involvements, they were placed in difficult conditions, including facilities for the
mentally ill. In 1986, while the Soviet Union began implementing economic and political
reforms, Cuba initiated a rectification program that attempted to diffuse any support for reforms
similar to those being implemented in Eastern Europe (Gastil 1990, 133). Freedom of the press
remained highly restricted and religious practices were discouraged, among other abysmal
conditions (Gastil 1982, 283; Gastil 1985, 286).
Significant changes did take place in the early 1990s, however. Unfortunately for Cuban
citizens, these changes were for the worse. In the year 1990 Freedom House downgrades Cuba’s

39

civil liberty status to a 7. Freedom in the World highlights several repressive and authoritarian
tactics that coincided with this downgrade. The Cuban regime announced in 1990 that it would
heighten the rectification process of promoting socialist principles, while discouraging notions
for reform. Castro strengthened his direct control over the Cuban Communist Party (PCC) and
the military as well. Castro and the PCC increase repression over the access to information, the
right to free speech and to organize politically, and the right to due process. In particular
repression of religious freedom was intense. Although they could join the Communist Party after
1990, Castro arrested Catholic leaders and prevented religious meetings, which were taking place
prior to a potential visit from the Pope in the summer of 1990 (Gastil 1990, 134).
Hundreds of political and human rights activists, including many of those interviewed by
the U.N. Human Rights Commission in 1988, were jailed in 1989, 1990, and 1991. Repression
was particularly high prior to significant political or social events, where activists were present.
During a visit by Mikhail Gorbachev in April 1989 dozens of individuals were arrested after
evidence revealed that they had planned to demonstrate in front of the Soviet leader. A similar
backlash against activists occurred prior to the hosting of the Pan American games in 1991.
These incidents, in addition to other roundups, added to the existing presence of 200 or 300
political prisoners. Other activists, who were luckily enough to avoid detainment, faced threats
and attacks from rapid action brigades, which were formed by security officials through the
auspices of the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution, a pro-Castro neighborhood
watchdog organization (Gastil 1990, 135; Gastil 1991, 170).
Other forms of liberty such as the freedom of press and movement were severely
repressed. In 1989 Cuba restricted the Red Cross’ access to prisons and expelled a number of
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foreign journalists. Ability to choose one’s residence or to leave the country was prohibited,
except until 1991, when Castro permitted some travel abroad (Gastil 1991, 170).

Sanctions
Strengthening Sanctions
Several actions were taken during the Reagan Administration to reverse the economic
openings initiated by President Ford and maintained under President Carter. In 1982 the Reagan
administration ended the 1977 fishing agreement with Cuba. The United States also reinstated
the travel ban to Cuba, as a means to limit potential economic benefits gained from tourism. In
1986 the embargo was made more strident so that Cuban-Americans could not send remittances
to their families in Cuba. Action was also taken to identify ships and businesses that were
secretly trading with the United States on behalf of Cuba. In 1986 the Office of Foreign Assets
Control created a list of 118 firms and persons operating as “fronts” to Cuba (Kaplowitz 1998,
124-126).
Reagan also amended the embargo to further restrict the flow of goods containing Cuban
nickel into the United States. The United States successfully convinced foreign states, including
France, Italy, the Netherlands, and Japan to guarantee that products being shipped to the United
States were made without Cuban nickel. In this regard the United States gained international
support for the embargo, and was not so isolated in its approach towards Cuba.
A major aspect of Reagan’s sanction policy focused on financial components of the
Cuban economy. As sugar prices dropped and access to foreign investment dwindled the Cuban
economy amassed billions of dollars in debt. The Reagan administration pressured foreign
bankers to deny Cuba new credit or to reschedule debts. Although it was able to interfere with
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some of Cuba’s commercial relations, the United States was unable to gain international
cooperation in preventing Cuba from obtaining new loans (Kaplowitz 1998, 128-129).
During the early years of the Bush administration the embargo was fortified as well. This
included heightened restrictions on the sharing of intellectual materials between the two
countries, which was originally exempted from the embargo under a law known as the Berman
Amendment. The Bush administration also moved to further restrict the flow of remittances.
After 1991 Cuban Americans were limited to sending their families 300 dollars per month
(Kaplowitz 1998, 149).
Economic sanctions in this era might have contributed to the worsening conditions in
Cuba in the late 1980s and early 1990s, albeit only in a minor way. During this time period the
Cuban regime faced intense economic pressure, which was probably worsened by U.S. sanctions
but was largely driven by an abrupt reduction in Soviet economic aid to Cuba. To counteract
these pressures the Cuban government implemented rationing and an intensive work initiative
through the rectification campaign. These programs worsened the living conditions of many
Cubans. While this impact was indirect and unintentional, it is in line with scholarship arguing
that certain economic suffering induced by sanctions can deprive vulnerable populations of
economic and basic rights. However, there is little evidence to confirm that economic sanctions
caused major changes in freedom in Cuba during this time. It is particularly hard to display
causality given the already poor economic conditions in Cuba.
The economic sanctions implemented by President Reagan and Bush probably failed
because they were able to make the embargo stronger at home, but proved largely unable to do
so multilaterally. One exception was the international support gained from France, Japan, and
others who were willing to oblige to the U.S. demands to label Cuban nickel. Although the
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economic impact of this policy was probably minor, it may have had some political benefits,
such as making the United States look less isolated in its Cuba policy. More importantly, Reagan
was unable to gain international or regional support for U.S. financial sanctions toward Cuba.
Financial sanctions tend to be more effective than traditional trade sanctions since they are more
difficult to avoid (Hufbauer, Elliott, and Schott, 2007, 47). Such sanctions could have debilitated
the Cuban economy and pushed it toward defaulting on its debt.
Finally, Reagan or Bush did not seek minor changes in Cuba. Rather both hoped to
significantly alter the domestic political and economic system and to remove Cuba from Angola,
Central America, and Ethiopia. As Hubauer, Schott, and Elliott argue, the success of sanctions
can be dependent upon the foreign policy goals of those sanctions. Minor changes tend to
produce better results than do major foreign policy goals. Reagan and Bush’s aspirations were
probably over ambitious.

Democratic Exposure
Diplomatic Hostility and Isolationism
The period 1981-1991 was characterized by heightened diplomatic hostility toward Cuba.
Rather than being open to normalization and willing to compromise as President Carter was,
President Reagan and Bush implemented diplomatic isolation toward the island. Both presidents
viewed the implementation of free and fair elections and Cuba’s withdrawal from Central
American and Africa as preconditions for normalization. These conditions would not be met
during either president’s terms in office, and neither would moves towards rapprochement.
Reagan in particular was concerned about Havana’s involvement in Central America,
Ethiopia and Angola. The president’s isolationist approach was showcased during a battle at the
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United Nations Human Rights Commission (UNHRC) in 1987, when Reagan instructed his UN
representatives to stress the issue of Cuba’s mistreatment of its political dissidents. At the
meeting, the Reagan administration hoped to persuade the UNHRC to pass a resolution
condemning Cuba. Despite persistent efforts from U.S. representatives, the resolution failed by
one vote (Gibbs 2011, 23). Another resolution was presented in 1988 when the UNHRC met
again, although that resolution was withdrawn when Cuba authorized the visit of a UNHRC
representative to Havana.
Reagan’s intransigence at the UNHRC meetings resulted in Havana accepting a visit
from a UNHRC representative and other compromises from the Cuban government. Throughout
this time Cuba continued to release prisoners and invite human rights organizations to the island.
In 1988 alone Americas Watch and Red Cross visited the island (Gibbs 2011, 23). Yet this seems
to be more of a politically motivated move by Castro to temporarily appease international
concerns over prison conditions, to only suppress citizens once concerns had calmed. Shortly
afterward Cuba was stepping up its harassment and abuse of political opposition and activists
through the reformation program launched in 1986. Moreover, as these organizations left the
island later that year, Cuba began imprisoning more political opponents (Gastil 1987).
The select diplomatic engagements that took place in the 1980s seemed to produce more
positive results. For example, the United States facilitated discussions between Angola, South
Africa, and Cuba, which resulted in Havana withdrawing troops from Angola. 1987 discussions
between Cuba and the United States led to the reinstatement of a migration accord established in
1984 (Kaplowitz 1998, 123).

Radio and T.V. Martí
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Reagan and Carter both viewed increasing the access to information in Cuba as a useful
mechanism to promote democratic ideas. How each administration went about heightening that
access was starkly contrasted. Carter sought to increase direct contact between Cubans and
Americans by opening up touristic, academic, and diplomatic exchanges. Reagan instead sought
to promote information flows through a U.S. sponsored propaganda initiative, Radio Martí. The
latter viewed tourism as a potential benefit to the Cuban economy. Moreover, American and
Cuban interaction went against Reagan’s policy of isolationism (Gibbs 2011, 31).
In 1981 President Reagan signed in to law Executive Order 12323 that created a
Commission on Broadcasting in Cuba. Despite some initial pushbacks from Congress a bill
entitled the Radio Broadcasting to Cuba Act passed in 1983 that would eventually facilitate the
creation of a radio station, Radio Martí. That station would be broadcast live in Cuba on a 24hour basis. Although hardline supporters of Radio Martí wanted to use it as a mechanism to
expose Cubans to the realities of the Cuban regime, and its repressive tendencies, it merely
offered informative information about world events. Since 1985 Radio Martí has also
broadcasted daily news, music, sports, and entertainment to Cubans (Walsh, 86-87).
Radio Martí faced a series of challenges that restricted its ability to reach the Cuban
people and have a significant impact on spreading democratic ideas as intended. Radio Martí
spent nearly three years in a period of limbo in which it had been authorized but had not
broadcast a single radio show. The United States was unable to hire sufficient staff to get the
broadcast running and was concerned about a possible jamming of frequencies by the Cuban
government (Walsh 2012, 90). When Radio Martí was finally initiated on May 20, 1985, almost
three years after its congressional approval, these concerns were made reality. Castro began
jamming Radio Marti by sending contradictory radio waves through the frequencies that Marti
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was being aired on. There were also serious doubts about how impactful Radio Martí’s content
was and whether it actually resonated with Cuban listeners (Walsh 2012, 94).
With time Radio Martí increased its level of exposure and effectiveness. Throughout
1986 and 1987 Cuban listenership increased significantly. Estimates in 1987 suggested that more
than half of the Cuban population listened to Radio Marti on a daily basis. Radio Martí covered
important issues such as the HIV/AIDs epidemic, the Chernobyl disaster and the conflicts in
Central American and Angola (Walsh 2012, 95-96).
As the economic situation in Cuba deteriorated in the final years of the decade President
Bush and hardliners in congress saw an opportunity to heighten information flows and to
promote factions against the Cuban regime. In 1990 President George H.W. Bush authorized the
creation of a television equivalent of Radio Martí, T.V. Marti. This program faced similar
challenges as Radio Marti. Many were troubled that a television signal from the United States
would be considerably weaker than a radio frequency, and thus easier for the Cubans to block.
Radio Marti faced confrontation in Congress, where U.S. officials raised issues of sovereignty
and international norms concerning telecommunications. After much debate congress and the
President authorized the Television Broadcasting to Cuba Act in January 1990. The program was
finally launched on March 27, 1990 but was immediately neutralized by Cuban interferers.
Within just a few months it was clear that T.V. Martí was a complete failure. Reports indicated
that very few Cubans had access to T.V. Martí’s programing (Walsh 2012, 126-127).
Radio and T.V. Martí could be described as ineffective simply based on their slow startup
times and Castro’s ability to block their signals, at least upfront. Broadcasting pro-democracy
programs can only have a liberalizing effect on an autocratic society if they expose that nation’s
population to democratic ideas (Richmond 2010). Of the two programs Radio Martí was the
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only one that Cuban’s tuned in to. Yet, its content was mostly informative, rather than
persuasive. It did not expose Cubans to the benefits of American life nor was it used as antiCastro propaganda. Therefore it comes at no surprise that there was not a significant rise of prodemocracy elements in Cuba during this time.
Rather than support democratic momentum in Cuba, these programs may have indirectly
impeded Cuba’s openness. It was clear that Castro viewed the implementation of Radio and T.V.
Martí as hostile acts. Not only did he order the interception of the radio stations frequency, but
also he also unilaterally ended the migration accord that had been established in 1984. By halting
the migration accord, the regime restricted thousands of Cubans’ right to free movement. As a
result thousands of Cuban exiles were forced to take the dangerous journey across the Florida
Straights on rafts made of wood.

Withdrawals from Migration
During the Reagan administration there were several instances that indicated a reversal of
the pro-migration and person-to-person exchanges instituted by Reagan’s predecessors. As
already noted in this chapter’s sanctions section, President Reagan viewed such exchanges as an
opportunity for Cuba to gain economic benefits. Thus, in April of 1982 President Reagan
revoked the travel authorizations granted under President Carter in 1977. Academic exchanges
took place at a significantly restricted rate (Kaplowitz 1998, 123).
Reagan also moved to cut off migration flows. He desperately wanted to prevent another
Mariel Crisis from occurring under his watch. In particular, the president was concerned about
the continued presence of criminal factions of the Marielitos, who had come to the United States
during the crisis. Several diplomatic attempts were made to repatriate the Mariel desirables, but
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were unsuccessful (Kaplowitz 1998, 123). An agreement came in 1984 shortly after Reagan’s
reelection. The United States and Cuba agreed to an immigration compromise in that year that
would return nearly three thousand of the Mariel refugees and allow for 20,000 Cuban visas to
be granted annually. The United States would also accept 30,000 political refugees and their
immediate families. This agreement was mutually beneficial. It would allow Castro to continue
to reduce anti-communist factions on the island, and for Reagan to return the undesirables that
had committed crimes in Cuba and were continuing to cause problems in the United States
(Perez-Stable 2011, 15).
The launch of Radio Marti in 1985 infuriated the Castro regime, however, which then
suspended the 1984 immigration agreement. The United States responded by halting migration
flows altogether. This suspension of entry visas for Cubans into the United States lasted for a
period of two years. As immigration to the United States became increasingly difficult less
Cubans managed to make the voyage to Florida. The most desperate, also known as balseros,
took to rafts and makeshift boats to escape Cuba. Altogether those that successfully made it via
balsas were slim. Less than 75,000 Cubans immigrated to the United States from 1981 to 1990
(Pedraza 1996, 323). After suffering a serious economic downturn in 1986 and 1987 however
Cuba became more conciliatory and initiated secret talks with Washington in 1987 in Mexico.
These resulted in the renewal of the 1984 immigration accord (Martínez and Resende 2006, 34;
Schmertz, Datlof, and Ugrinsky, 384).

Domestic Economic Factors
Collapse of Soviet Aid
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Throughout the 1980s the Cuban economy deteriorated. Initial problems stemmed from
bad commodity prices. Already low sugar prices in the late early 1980s further declined in the
mid and late 1980s. The price of sugar dropped from 25 cents per pound in 1980 to 3 cents in
1985. The low price of oil also hurt Cuba since it often re-exported Soviet oil imports. Also
debilitating was the devaluation of the dollar, which caused Cuba’s purchasing power to go
down and foreign debt to go up. Finally, as Cuba’s economic conditions worsened, the U.S.
embargo became more effective, at least in an economic sense. In the mid-1980s the U.S.
embargo was costing Cuba about 400 million dollars per year (Kaplowitz 1998, 118).
Cuba took several steps to counteract these issues. Cuba heightened existing economic
relationships with the Soviet Union and other communist bloc countries. By mid-decade Cuba
was making more money re-exporting Soviet oil than it was exporting sugar, its largest export at
the time. Cuba also increased ties with Latin American states, Europe and Asia. Finally, as part
Castro’s rectification campaign, Cuba began conserving some goods and required Cubans to
work harder for less money (Kaplowitz 1998, 118-119).
Yet these initiatives could only slightly offset the economic pains that were yet to come.
As Cuba was building up its economic dependence on the Soviet Union, its own political
economy became more aligned and vulnerable to the conditions in that country. The 1980s were
a bad time to be dependent on the Soviet Union. Under the policies of perestroika and glasnost
Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev reformed the Soviet Union. This liberalization fostered future
reform movements in Eastern Europe that would lead to the overthrow of several communist
regimes in the region. When socialist factions within the Soviet Union began losing power in
favor of democratic proponents Cuba was headed for trouble. The Soviet Union stopped buying
Cuban sugar at prices above international market level. It was also announced that the Soviets
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would soon end the oil-for-sugar barter system that had disproportionately benefited Cuba for
three decades (Kaplowitz 1998, 145).
Economic troubles worsened at the start of the 1990s. Trade with communist countries
further declined and subsidized soviet oil continued to diminish. In 1991 the Soviet Union
collapsed. Economic assistance from that country dwindled. In 1989 Soviet aid to Cuba was
about five billion dollars. By 1992 the Soviets offered Cuba nothing. In an attempt to counteract
these changes Cuba sought increased trade with countries in Latin America, and with Japan,
China, and Europe. However, the damage could not fully be offset. Cuba was in full economic
collapse by 1991. Cuba’s official estimates suggest that GDP shrank by 35 percent from 1989 to
1993 Gibbs 2011, 27 (Kaplowitz 1998, 145).
The economic factors were in place for a transition toward openness to occur. In fact,
many international groups and journalists predicted that a democratic transition in Cuba was
imminent (Gibbs 2011, 28). While scholarship suggests that poor economic conditions should
lead to liberalization in an autocratic regime, the intermediate factors for liberalization were not
present (Acemoglu, Robinson and Yared 2005). Foremost, average Cubans were not uniting and
demanding reforms.
The failure for Cuba to liberalize and for Cubans to advocate vigorously for reform
despite economic collapse probably happened for two reasons. First, Cubans did not have
enough access about the reformist movements taking place in Eastern Europe and the Soviet
Union. Not only did Castro limit access to such information, but Cuba was geographically
separated from these incidents as well. Laurence Whitehead suggests that proximity to
democratic societies is an important external factor in promoting liberalization. Those closer to
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democratic societies tend to be more prone to democracy as well (1996). Cubans status as an
island nation has long isolated it from global trends such as democratization in the 1990s.
Second, Castro moved quickly to repress dissent through his rectification campaign so
that those with any inclination towards expressing reformist ideas were quickly discouraged. For
example, before the Fourth Congress of the PCC in October 1991, many international human
rights organizations on the island organized to demand free elections, freedom of political
association, and for the lifting of travel restrictions, among other human rights (Gastil 1991,
169). Yet before these activists could gain popular support, they were severely repressed. The
state security forces attacked those demanding reform and jailed several of them as well. This
showed others who were considering opposing the regime would be met with instant repression.
Thus, in contradiction to what scholars such as Acemoglu, Robinson, and Yared predict, we
actually observe that the deteriorating economic conditions in Cuba resulted in an increase in
repression and a tightening of autocratic principles.
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Chapter III: Heightened Economic Pressure and Obama’s Rapprochement (1991-2015)

Overview
At the start of the 1990s Cuba was still dealing with the economic decline caused by the
dissolution of the Soviet Union. Cuba strengthened its rectification campaign, based on rationing
and collectivist principles, to deal with the economic troubles. Yet conditions only worsened
over time. By 1993 Cuba, facing firmer sanctions from the United States, was near economic
collapse. Cuba implemented a series of economic reforms under the slogan “Special Period in
Peacetime”, indicating that they would only be temporary openings. In order to strengthen his
position of power Fidel Castro also repressed the nascent political opposition movement in Cuba.
At the end of the decade Cuba had dodged economic collapse, and Castro remained firmly in
power.
At the turn of the century Cuba faced new problems. The opposition movement on the
island was growing somewhat. In response, the Cuban regime heightened repression once again.
Additionally, Cuba’s leader, Fidel Castro, faced deteriorating health. In 2006 he relinquished
power to his brother, Raul. This exchange led directly to a series of economic liberalizations.
Changes in Cuban economic policy were met with a reformation of U.S. diplomatic efforts.
Rather than isolate the island as many of his predecessors had done, President Barack Obama has
sought to engage the Cuban government and its people.

Civil Liberties
Continued Repression in the Face of Ridicule

52

Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s Freedom House continued to award Cuba scores
of 7 on civil liberties. Freedom of association and organization, freedom to travel, religious
freedom, and freedom of the press were all severely restricted. In a few instances some reforms
of liberalization were made, but these were temporary and merely served to the political or
economic benefit of the Castro Regime. On occasions where the regime was questioned or when
opposition groups demanded reform, heightened repression followed.
Repression against political opposition organizations continued throughout the 1990s.
Cuba maintained several hundred political prisoners throughout the decade. In 1993 it was
estimated that at least 500 prisoners were being held in Cuba. This number was raised to 600 in
1994 (Gastil 1995). In 1996 dozens of opposition members belonging to the Cuban Council, a
group of opposition organizations were arrested for forming a meeting (Gastil 1997). In July
1997 security officials threatened more than a dozen dissidents when they released a document
asking for free expression, assembly, and other civil and political rights (Gastil 1997). Many of
these individuals were tortured or held in psychiatric facilities. Throughout the 1990s and until
2007 Cuba denied requests from the United Nations for the presence of a human rights
representative in the country to examine prison conditions and the status of other facilities.
The freedom to travel was restricted throughout the 1990s. To leave the country Cubans
were required to obtain exit permits, which were difficult to get. Attempts to escape the country
were met with prison time. In 1994 many Cuban refugees were shot at as they tried to escape the
island and reach the U.S. base at Guantanamo Bay. About 1,000 individuals were arrested for
attempting to leave the island in 1994 (Gastil, 1997). In 1994 massive riots took place in Havana,
where thousands of Cubans gathered demanding refuge in the United States and chanting anti-
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Castro slogans. Nearly 700 people were detained and thirty-five were injured (Perez-Stable 2011,
30)
Freedom of religion was virtually non-existent in Cuba during the early 1990s. Until
1991 religious believers were officially discriminated against and only atheists could participate
politically. In that year Religious believers were allowed to join the Communist Party permitted
they make an official commitment to the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC) (Gastil 1992). Prior to
a visit from the Pope in 1998 religious activities were authorized and Christmas was celebrated
for the first time in 28 years (“Freedom in the World Report: Cuba” 1999).
Freedom of the press was heavily restricted. Throughout the decade several non-statesponsored media outlets were restricted from entering the country and several were expelled
while working in Cuba. For example, in 1993 a Miami Herald journalist was expelled from Cuba
(Gastil, 1994). Such expulsions were common. Prior to ceremonies for the opening of the
National Assembly in 1998 several foreign journalists were sent home (“Freedom in the World
Report: Cuba” 1999).
At times minor reforms were introduced that eased repression of opposition groups, but
usually when such action was politically or economically advantageous for the Cuban
government. Moreover, such actions were often temporary or offset with heightened repression
elsewhere. In 1992, for example, Castro released several dozen political prisoners (Gastil 1993).
Castro furthered eased civil liberties that year when he introduced constitutional reform to end
formal discrimination against religious believers. However, both actions were made prior to a
meeting with Latin American states and the Spanish government from whom Castro sought to
gain economic assistance. When the meeting proved unsuccessful, President Castro arrested
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dissidents and granted himself further control over the military and the National Defense
Council.
Castro did make some significant concessions prior to a 1998 visit by Pope John Paul II.
In June 1998 the number of political prisoners on the island was numbered at 381, down from
more than 1,000 two years prior (Gastil 1999). Castro responded directly to the Pope’s requests
to release 300 political prisoners. Instead of the Pope’s number Castro freed 140 prisoners.
However, in the same year four prominent opposition leaders, known as the Group of Four, faced
and were later arrested for sedition charges. Relaxation of repression prior to the Pope’s visit
seemed merely an attempt to appease foreign pressures rather than a move towards liberalization.
In 1999, just a year after the visit, Fidel Castro introduced anti-subversive legislation, Law No.
88, which targeted independent and foreign media, and the growing opposition movement on the
island (“Freedom in the World Report: Cuba” 2000). Through this legislation those speaking
poorly of the government could face up to 20 years in prison. In subsequent years dozens of
journalists were arrested or forced into exile via this legislation.
The regime was truly tested with the rise of opposition movements in 2002 that gained
domestic and international attention. The Varela Project and its leader, Oswaldo Paya, gained
recognition from former U.S. president Jimmy Carter when he visited in June 2002. The Project
collected 11,000 signatures of individuals who wanted referendums on the right to speech and
vote, along with other reforms (“Freedom in the World Report: Cuba” 2003). Unfortunately,
these developments were met with heightened repression, rather than reform. 75 dissidents and
journalists were arrested in April 2003. All of the accused were found guilty. Shortly after the
signatures were submitted, Havana held a referendum that declared socialism to be
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“untouchable” in effect voiding the signatures of any legitimacy (“Freedom in the World Report:
Cuba” 2004).

Fidel Relinquishes Power and Several Reforms Ensue
In 2006 after a stint in the hospital due to internal bleeding, Fidel Castro, at the age of 80,
relinquished power to his brother, Raul. At first, little change seemed imminent. Raul continued
the level of repression and economic control present under his brother. In 2007, however, Raul
began to discuss the possibility of economic reform. More significantly, in his first year as
temporary leader Raul authorized the release of more than 50 long-term political prisoners
(“Freedom in the World Report: Cuba” 2008).
In 2008 Raul was named full-time president as Fidel announced his official retirement.
What followed was a series of reforms, particularly economic ones, which motivated Freedom
House to downgrade Cuba’s civil liberties score from 7 to 6 (“Freedom in the World Report:
Cuba” 2009). Economic reforms included allowing Cubans to buy consumer goods and to stay in
tourist hotels, and the elimination of salary caps. Cuban farmers were also given greater
autonomy over their businesses. Also in 2008 Raul watched over the release of more political
prisoners, including 20 of those arrested in the 2003 crackdown following the Varela Project
(“Freedom in the World Report: Cuba” 2009). Raul permitted the signing of two UN human
rights treaties. In particular, Cuba displayed openness with its involvement in the gay rights
movement. The government sponsored an International Day Against Homophobia, initiated a
center to test patients for STDs, and began providing sexual realignment surgeries for
transsexuals.
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Indications that Raul would offer a greater opening of society and easing of civil liberty
controls continued in the years ahead. Several political prisoners, including prominent dissidents,
were released from prison in 2009 (“Freedom in the World Report: Cuba” 2010). Thanks to
negotiations between the Catholic Church and the Spanish government, and Cuba, the Cuban
government started to release many of the remaining prisoners from the crackdown on dissent in
2003. Most of these prisoners were sent in exile to Spain, but many refused to leave and
remained in prison. These releases were a direct result of negotiations between Cuba, and the
Catholic Church and the Spanish government. By 2010 the number of political prisoners in Cuba
was down to 167 (“Freedom in the World Report: Cuba” 2011). By December 2011 less than 75
political prisoners were being held on the island, although short-term detentions and harassment
of dissidents were more common (“Freedom in the World Report: Cuba” 2012).

A Trend Toward Openness
In recent times economic reforms are continuing. The government has cut the amount of
public sector jobs and authorized opportunities in the private sector. In 2011 it was announced
that Cubans could more freely purchase homes and cars. (“Freedom in the World Report: Cuba”
2012)
Other reforms are taking place as well. Raul Castro has led efforts to reduce corruption
and abuses of power in the government and state controlled industries. In January 2013 the
government eliminated the exit visa requirement so that Cubans could more freely leave the
island (“Freedom in the World Report: Cuba” 2014). Restrictions regarding residency in Cuba
were also rescinded. As a result of these reforms dissidents, human rights organization, and
leaders are freer to travel abroad. The independent press has gained some freedom under the
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Raul’s leadership as well. The national newspaper Grandma, for example, has been able to
publish articles critical of the government. Other publications with low readership and some
Catholic newspapers are able to criticize the government as well. In 2013 the government opened
more than 100 Internet cafes throughout the country. The small community of Internet users and
bloggers, such as the internationally recognized Yoani Sanchez, has been able to ridicule the
government online (“Freedom in the World Report: Cuba” 2014). Some improvements have
been made regarding the ability to organize and protest. In 2014 the Ladies in White organization
was allowed to march in December (“Freedom in the World Report: Cuba” 2015)
On December 17, 2014 Cuba and the United States reinstated their diplomatic relations
after more than 50 years of isolation. The rapprochement resulted in Cuba agreeing to release 53
political prisoners and of Alan Gross, the government contractor who was arrested in 2009. The
United States also released three of the remaining “Cuban Five”, several Cuban spies who were
arrested in the late 1990s on espionage charges (Freedom in the World Report: Cuba” 2015.

Sanctions
Cuban Democracy Act and the LIBERTAD Act
In the early 1990s the United States viewed the struggling Cuban economy as an
opportunity to further strangle the island through sanctions. It also suspected that the fall of the
Soviet Union would increase the likelihood of a similar collapse in Havana. In 1992 George
H.W. Bush passed the Torricelli act, also known as the Cuban Democracy Act (CDA). This
legislation prevented foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies from trading with the island and
restricted ships that trade with Cuba from entering the United States. Under the bill improvement
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in relations between the two countries would only take place if Cuba implemented democratic
and economic reforms (Kaplowitz 1998, 148).
Amidst fears that President Clinton (1993-2001) might take a more conciliatory approach
to Cuba, the subcommittee on Western Hemispheric Affairs passed a resolution in 1993 calling
for an international embargo against Cuba (Perez-Stable 2011, 29). Obviously this would not
come. But, it signaled to President Clinton that more economic isolation was desired. President
Clinton would not disappoint. In 1996, after easily passing the Senate and House, the HelmsBurton Act, officially the Cuban LIBERTAD Act, was implemented. The Libertad Act banned
imports of Cuban products from third party countries. The law also allowed U.S. citizens to sue
foreign companies and individuals who have obtained goods or property from Cuba that was
owned by U.S. citizens prior to the Cuban revolution (Perez-Stable 2011, 33).

Clinton’s Modest Relaxation of Sanctions
In strengthening its own embargo, the United States further isolated itself in its policy
toward Cuba. In 1992, shortly after the passing of the CDA, the United Nations passed a
resolution against the U.S. embargo (Perez-Stable 2011, 43). No other country maintained a
similar policy toward the island and, in fact, in the early 1990s Western and Latin American
countries were increasing economic relations with Cuba. In August 1996, shortly after the
Helms-Burton Law was passed, the Inter-American Juridical Committee (IAJC), with support
from OAS members, ruled that the law went against international norms (Perez-Stable 2011, 65).
In response to the IAJC decision and a potentially similar solution from the WTO, President
Clinton decided to waive the most controversial aspect of the Helms-Burton Law, which allowed
individuals to sue third party companies that were trading expropriated goods in U.S. courts.
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Clinton continued to show a desire for conciliation during the latter years of his tenure. In
2000 the United States relaxed economic sanctions regarding trade on food and medicine to
Cuba through the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act. Although hesitant to
accept the initiative at first, Cuba began importing U.S. agricultural products following the
devastating Hurricane Michelle in 2001. By 2004 Cuba had become the twenty-fifth largest
market for U.S. food exports as sales reached nearly 400 million dollars in that year alone (MesaLago and Perez-Lopez 2005, 38). Agricultural interest and lobbyist groups in the United States
continued to support the relaxation of the embargo during this time.

Contemporary U.S. Sanctions
Despite strong influence from Cuba hardliners, including his brother, the Florida
governor, Jeb Bush, President George W. Bush did not bolster the sanction policies implemented
by his predecessor. His impact on U.S. sanctions policy was limited. President Bush did limit the
amount of money that family members could send to Cubans through remittances and travel,
however. President Barack Obama, notwithstanding his support to end economic sanctions, has
been unable to pass legislation to terminate the embargo. He has, however, reduced restrictions
on allowing U.S. companies to work in Cuba, and the amount of money that can be brought to
the island, among other minor economic relaxations (Reuters 2015). However trade sanctions
remain intact. The embargo cannot be undone through executive action, and will need to be
reversed by the U.S. Congress.
Overall, it once again seems that economic sanctions were not successful in promoting
liberalization in Cuba. At the time of the implementation of the CDA (1992) and the Libertad
Act (1996) Cuba was actually revving up its repression of the nascent dissident and pro-
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democracy movement on the island. It was also strengthening the rectification campaign, which
reduced workers’ rights and Cuban’s access to food.
As the United States furthered its embargo toward Cuba, it became increasingly isolated
in the International arena. At the same time Cuba was gaining increased support abroad. This is
evidenced by the IAJC vote that found the embargo in conflict with international norms, and at
U.N. meetings throughout the 1990s and 2000s where the general body voted to condemn the
U.S. embargo towards Cuba (Whitefield 2015). This is in support of Hufbauer, Schott, and
Elliot, who posit that sanctions imposed upon a target country with high levels of support will be
unlikely to achieve its aims.
Moreover, the sanctions seemed to do little to mobilize domestic opposition against the
Castro regime, as proponents of economic sanctions predict. Rather than lose support, Castro
actually was gaining it. This fact has a lot to do with the history of the U.S.-Cuba relationship
and Cuban sentiments toward the United States. Since the Bay of Pigs operation in 1961 Cubans
feared that another U.S. invasion was feasible. Castro often preyed on these fears, and, when the
United States displayed hostility toward Cuba through the implementation of sanctions, he
exaggerated the likelihood of U.S. intervention (Ritter 2004, 38). This strengthened Castro’s
position in power and increased his ability to repress the small opposition factions. This situation
fits into the predictions of Peksen, who predicts that sanctions might cause a “rally around the
flag” effect (2007). Through ridiculing U.S. economic policies that were ostensibly aggressive
Castro was able to heighten support and Cuban nationalism.

Democratic Exposure
“Wet-Foot Dry-Foot”
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Leaving the island without permission was prohibited throughout the 1990s, except when
granted an exit permit, which were difficult to obtain. Still, the 1984 migration agreement, which
provided 20,000 annual U.S. visas to Cuban citizens, and the 1966 Cuban Adjustment Act,
which offered preferential treatment towards Cuban immigrants in the United States, remained
intact. More than 10,000 Cubans migrated to the United States every year from 1988 to 1993 on
a legal basis. Due to worsening economic conditions on the island several thousands more
migrated illegally (Perez-Stable 2011, 30). Eventually the demand for migration outnumbered
the supply of exit-permits in Cuba and visas in the United States. Pressures to allow further
migration surmounted in 1994 as rationing under Castro’s rectification campaign reached
intolerable levels. Following a mass riot in Havana in August 1994, known as the Maleconazo,
Fidel Castro announced that he would no longer restrict Cubans from leaving the island. In the
course of one month 35,000 Cubans attempted to reach the United States via makeshift rafts, or
balseros, most of which the U.S. Coast Guard captured. In September the crisis ended when
Washington and Havana established a new migration agreement. Similar to the 1984 migration
accord, the United States agreed to take in 20,000 Cubans annually. Cuba would prevent the
continued departure of Cubans on rafts (Gastil 1994). In May 1995 the U.S. government would
alter its migration policy in a way that deterred migration flows. In what came to be known as
the “wet-foot dry-foot” policy, Washington altered the 1966 Cuban Adjustment Act so that those
Cubans found at sea would be returned to Cuba and those found on U.S. soil, whether there
legally or illegally, would be permitted to stay.
For quite some time this agreement would stand and Cubans seeking refuge in the United
States would not have to embark on a dangerous journey. The agreement was stalled in 2000,
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however, when Cuba began denying exit permits to Cubans (“Freedom in the World Report:
Cuba” 2001).
In 2013 Cuba eliminated the exit visa requirements for travel abroad. Also in that year
Cuba’s were allowed to travel abroad for an extended 24-month period. Formerly Cubans could
only travel for 11 months, after that their residency would be lost. After the 2013 reforms, former
refugees were also able to reapply for lost residency in the country (“Freedom in the World
Report: Cuba” 2014). As a direct result of these restrictions human rights organizations were
able to travel abroad and work with other international organizations. For example Yoani
Sanchez traveled to more than 12 countries in that year.
The Cuban Democracy Act, in addition to tightening restrictions on trade with Cuba,
enabled Washington to implement a policy of engagement with the island (although the bill has
been known far more for strengthening sanctions). In 1993 President Clinton utilized the policy
to ease a variety of restrictions towards Cuba, including regulations regarding travel, academic
exchanges, and remittances. Clinton’s actions also opened a Western Union in Cuba and enabled
U.S. NGOs to cooperate with their Cuban counterparts (Perez 2003, 275).
Travel and exchange continued between the two countries during the early years of the
Bush Administration. In the early 2000s several thousand Americans journeyed to Cuba and
several senators and representatives visited the island as well (Perez-Stable 2011, 87). In his
Initiative for a New Cuba plan, President Bush continued this strategy by offering scholarships to
Cuban students, and reducing barriers to providing humanitarian and business assistance to
Cuban organizations. In response to the 2002 imprisonment of 75 Cuban political dissidents
Bush heightened support for civil society and human rights organizations on the island. He also
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increased the amount of cash that Cubans could bring to their family members during visits to
3000 dollars.

Limitations Following Cuban Aggression
Bush changed course, however, when the Cuban government carried out a series of
aggressive actions in the spring of 2003. This included the execution of three men who had
hijacked a ferry crossing the Florida Straits. In 2004 Bush restricted visits to family members to
once every three years and limited remittances to only immediate family members and
grandparents (Perez-Stable 2011, 92). In 2006 the White House ordered an updated version of
the Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba. This included supplying 80 million dollars in aid
for Cuban opposition groups. These policies would remain intact during Bush’s tenure.

Obama’s Engagement Approach
Democratic President Barack Obama significantly heightened diplomatic and crosscountry exchanges between the Untied States and Cuba. First, President Obama removed all
restrictions that prevented Cuban Americans to visit their family members or to send money to
relatives. Obama’s executive action also allowed telecommunication companies to increase
business in Cuba, and increased humanitarian aid to the island (Perez-Stable 2011, 120). The two
countries started talks on issues including migration and postal service to the island. In the first
year of the Obama administration travel to the island increased significantly (Perez-Stable 2011,
121). Academic and political exchanges increased as well with several high-level visits to the
island occurring, including one from New Mexico Governor Bill Richardson.
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With much thanks to mediation from The Vatican, on December 17, 2014 Cuba and the
United States reinstated their diplomatic relations after more than 50 years of isolation. Since
then Obama has worked with the Cuban government on a variety of topics ranging from
migration, disaster risk reduction, counternarcotic policy, and direct mail. Obama has also
promoted travel opportunities to the island. American citizens can travel to Cuba for academic,
business, and religious activities (“Charting a New Course on Cuba” 2016).
The effects of engagement policies in the 1990s and early 2000s are unclear. Although
migration to the United States increased during the early 1990s, it is unlikely that migration led
to a significant increase in person-to-person exchanges. Exile visits to Cuba and the sending of
remittances were restricted throughout this time period. Exchanges between exiles and their
families were further limited after Bush’s reforms in 2006. In fact, migration might have once
again strengthened Castro’s control of Cuba since many migrants in the early 1990s left because
of economic reasons. Many exiles were upset about the limited access to economic opportunity
and to general consumer goods thanks to the rectification campaign.
It is too early to tell if Obama’s decision to support exchanges between Cubans and
Americans has produced positive results. Although dissident groups have a presence on the
island, they existed and were growing long before the relaxation of travel and family visit rules.
However, the diplomatic rapprochement between the two countries is clearing producing positive
results even at this early stage in the process of normalization. As part of the 2014 negotiations
Cuba agreed to release several dozen political prisoners. Discussions have also encouraged the
growth of market-oriented reforms and to improve Cuban’s access to the Internet.
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Domestic Economic Factors
Economic Struggles During “A Special Period in Peacetime”
Cuba remained under intense economic pressure in the early 90s as the Soviet Union
declined and officially collapsed in August 1991 following the failed coup by Soviet hardliners.
At first Castro responded to the pressure by heightening socialist style economics and reducing
state rations through the already established rectification campaign. However, conditions
worsened in the early 1990s. Fidel Castro announced a “Special Period in Peacetime” in 1990 to
implement a series of economic liberalization policies. The reform process started in earnest and
took off in 1993. Between 1993 and 1996 the Cuban government legalized the U.S. dollar,
authorized private farming cooperatives, and expanded self-employment opportunities, among
other market-oriented reforms (Mesa-Lago and Perez-Lopez 2005, 18). Havana also attempted to
heighten trade and foreign direct investment elsewhere, particularly from former Soviet
republics.
Slowly an economic turnaround took place. In 1995 the economy began to grow. In 1996
GDP grew by 7.8 percent (Mesa-Lago and Perez-Lopez 2005, 20) and for several years export
and import grew and the value of the peso appreciated. In particular, the Cuban economy
benefited from a booming tourist industry, which was authorized in the series of reforms from
1993 to 1996.
The economic success did not last long, however. Nor did the economic reforms that
preceded it. Despite the successes of such reforms, the PCC feared that continued market
relaxation went against the ideology of the state and threatened the power of Cuba’s leadership.
As soon as the economy stabilized, new restrictions were placed on foreign investors, taxes and
fees were assessed on private sector employees, and many other reversals took place. From 1996

66

to the early 2000s economic growth slowed considerably. Trade declined and the governmental
deficit ballooned (Mesa-Lago and Perez-Lopez 2005, 22). Amidst worsening sugar prices Cuba
was forced to close down nearly half of its 156 sugar mills. As a result, thousands of Cubans
were left without jobs (“Freedom in the World Report: Cuba” 2003). The economy was also
setback in 2001 due to Hurricane Michelle, which destroyed crops and infrastructure, and
because of the September 11 Attacks, which reduced global tourism. Cuba also suffered from
lower prices for Nickel, one of the island’s main exports (Mesa Lago and Perez-Lopez 2005, 3435).
By the early 2000s many reform-minded economic leaders who implemented the
successful 1993-96 policies were removed from office. Economic restrictions that strengthened
the state’s control over the market continued throughout the early 2000s. The government’s 2003
decision to require all governmental business transactions to take place in pesos restricted
investment and caused unnecessary expenses. In 2004 new consumer restrictions were
implemented so that only a select group could apply to purchase vehicles. In 2004 the regime
banned the use of the dollar for economic transactions and began to reduce the amount of
licenses for entrepreneurial ventures.

New Allies and New Hope
The economic situation reversed course in 2005 when tourism began to increase once
again and large amounts of foreign investment arrived from Venezuela, China, and Spain, who
were interested in Cuba’s nickel industry, among other economic opportunities. In particular
Cuba strengthened its economic alliance with the Venezuelan government, who shared many of
Cuba’s socialist principles. Thanks to an agreement signed in October 2000 Cuba received
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thousands of barrels of cheap oil from Venezuela. By 2006 Cuba was importing nearly 100,000
barrels of subsidized oil per day from Venezuela. In exchange Cuba sent tens of thousands of
highly trained doctors to Venezuela. China and Russia became much stronger economic partners
with Cuba as well. Cuba and China have negotiated deals on oil exploration, biotechnology, and
trade. The former Soviet Union agreed to restructure Cuba’s substantial debt in 2007 and the two
countries made agreements on oil exploration and military technology (Perez-Stable 2011, 108110).
The transition of power from Fidel Castro to his brother Raul had significant impacts on
the Cuban economy. Raul began economic liberalization in earnest in 2007 when the government
ended its control of milk prices and halted the practice of fining private taxi drivers. Raul
permitted Cubans to buy consumer goods such as cell phones and allowed them to stay in tourist
hotels (“Freedom in the World Report: Cuba” 2008). The new president also removed caps on
salaries and increased the pension rate for retirees. Farmers were able to buy their own supplies
and lease unused land from the state.
At times the pace of reform has been halted. Cuba’s Old Guard has been particularly
influential in restricting reform during times of economic crisis. In August and September of
2008 when Cuba was hit by two Hurricanes the agricultural industry was severely hurt,
infrastructure was damaged, and an economic downturn was predicted. President Raul Castro
implemented economic controls including a ban on street vending. The United States offered
Cuba emergency aid, but the Cuban government refused to accept (Perez-Stable 2011, 135).
Economic struggles continued in 2009 when the government was forced to close several state
businesses and reinstate the rationing of electricity.
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Recently the government’s calls for economic opening have been followed with more
consistent reforms. In 2011 at the Cuban Communist Party Congress a variety of economic
openings were approved. Cubans can now buy consumer goods such as appliances and cell
phones. They are also able to sell and buy used cars and stay in hotels in Cuba’s tourist district.
Many Cubans are involved in the real estate and private agricultural industry. Nearly 500,000
Cubans are currently self-employed. Due to these reforms and because of better global economic
conditions Cuba’s economy has done well as of late. GDP has steadily increased over the past
several years, unemployment remains low, and living standards are high (“The World Factbook:
Cuba” 2016).
Yet these reforms have not coincided with strong economic growth. In recent years
growth has slowed sharply. Cuba’s foreign debt was about one fifth of total GDP in 2014, and
real GDP growth was only about 1.3 percent (“The World Factbook: Cuba” 2016). One main
cause of this is that global oil prices are way down from pre-recession highs. Heavily discounted
oil from Venezuela does not produce large profits when re-exported, as they did in the early
2000s. Additionally problematic for Cuba has been its relationship with China. Due to the U.S.
embargo Cuba is limited in who can serve as its international lenders. China has filled that void
and provided billions in credit to the island. Unlike the Soviet Union, China has required that
Cuba pay its debt back in hard currency and do so on time. Moreover, Chinese companies and
authorities have pressured Cuba to modernize the economy and make investments more efficient
(“China Restructures Cuban Debt, Backs Reform” 2010).
Two periods of economic liberalization took place from 1991 to present. The first,
starting in 1993, was a clear result of the worsening economic conditions on the island. To
counteract the decline Cuba initially implemented a rectification campaign meant to strengthen
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socialist principles and ration goods. When this failed and economic collapse continued, Cuba
was forced into implementing its Special Period in Peacetime. Although the presence of
opposition groups did not develop as predicted by scholars Acemoglu, Robinson, and Yared
reformist factions within the government pushed for reforms. When the economy recovered in
the late 1990s, Castro regained political stability, and reversed the economic openings
implemented earlier in the decade. Hard-liners in Cuba also gained traction due to the
strengthening of U.S. sanctions toward Cuba. Fidel had long succeeded in raising nationalism
and support when economic sanctions were present. When the Helms-Burton and Torricelli Law
were passed in 1996 and 1992, respectively, Castro gained support by criticizing U.S.
“interventionism” (Ritter 2004, 38).
The second period of economic liberalization, from 2006 to present, is not likely a result
of internal economic factors, but rather due to the internal political transition of power.
Economic reforms only took place right after Raul Castro took over in 2006. Although
economic conditions were not overly positive at the time, Cuba was neither facing economic
collapse. However, continued economic pressures, from difficulties associated with economic
and political instability in Venezuela and from the intensifying relationship with China, have
contributed to recent reforms. Without financial support from socialist regimes abroad, Cuba has
been required to implement economic reforms on two occasions. As Cuba becomes subject to
international economic cycles and to stricter creditor-debtor relations it will face economic
pressures and continue to reform.
Two periods of fluctuations in politically related civil liberties took place during this
period. In both instances economic conditions were likely significant in influencing change. The
first, during the early and mid 1990s, and somewhat in the early 2000s, involved heightened
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restrictions on political expression and on the freedom of travel. Economic problems were high
and probably encouraged the unusually intense civil discontent on the island. In the early 1990s
Cubans were faced with heightened demands for conservation from the state, while they were
simultaneously being told to work harder. Economic reforms, particularly the legalization of the
dollar in 1993, altered the social environment as a new wealthy class developed. The majority of
Cubans faced lowering wages (Gastil 1997). In the early 2000s the sugar industry failed and
many were let off from work. In both instances economic troubles fueled social dissatisfaction.
In 2002 a Cuban representative from the United Nations, among other experts, suggested that
social discontent was a result of internal economic struggles (“Freedom in the World Report:
Cuba” 2003).
Rather than acquiescing to dissident demands, Fidel perceived the changing political
climate as a threat to his power and increased repression of dissident groups. Again we do not
observe the predictions of Acemoglu, Robinson, and Yared to be true (2005). While we witness
heightened internal pressure for change during economic crisis, it does not result in political
liberalizations from the Cuban regime as those scholars predict.
The second period of change constituted improvements in political freedoms. Long-term
political imprisonment declined and dissidents were not repressed as fiercely as they had been in
the past. These reforms coincided with some economic problems, like the reduction of
Venezuelan assistance and pressure from Chinese economic partners, but with relative economic
stability. Thus, although internal economic conditions clearly influenced economic reforms, it is
less clear how they might be promoting recent political liberalizations.
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Analysis of Hypotheses

Sanctions

Hypothesis 1: economic sanctions will fail to bring about liberalization in a target state
(HSE 2007).

In implementing sanctions, a sender country attempts to induce economic conditions that
are so costly it will require the target country to reform (Hufbauer Schott, and Elliot, 2007). Yet
the United States was almost never able to do this. In each chapter, Chapter I (1966-1981),
Chapter II (1981-1991), and in Chapter III (1991-present), we observe that sanctions did not
bring about liberalization in Cuba. Thus, we are able to confirm Hypothesis 1. During the period
1966 to 1981 the strength of sanctions are reduced under Presidents Gerald Ford and Jimmy
Carter. The reduction of sanctions led to Fidel Castro negotiating with the Carter administration,
and eventually, to releasing thousands of political prisoners on the island.
In the era 1981 to 1991 we observe an increase in sanctions and a corresponding
worsening of civil liberty conditions. Again economic sanctions failed to bring about
liberalization in Cuba. In fact, sanctions might actually have furthered political repression during
this time period. As mentioned earlier in this project, internal economic conditions deteriorated
at the end of the 1980s due to the collapse of the Soviet Union. Facing internal pressure due to
poor economic conditions, Castro heightened repression toward those advocating for change.
The sanctions in place further contributed to the economic collapse and thereby contributed to
Castro’s repressive policies.
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Sanctions advocates suggest that economic embargoes might reduce internal support for
the targeted regime, and thereby lead to liberalization. Instead we observe something akin to the
“rally around the flag” effect predicted by Peksen (2007). Rather than lose support, Castro was
able to gain popularity by inciting existing Cuban concerns about U.S. interventionism in Cuba.
The Cuban regime continued to repress dissidents, and moved forward with its rectification
campaign, which restricted Cubans access to consumer goods and foodstuffs.

Hypothesis 2: if economic sanctions are implemented with the support of international
organizations or other countries, then sanctions will be more likely to bring about liberalization
in the target state (HSE 2007)

The results for this hypothesis are mixed. Throughout the history of the U.S. embargo,
sanctions have largely been unilateral. With the exception of OAS sanctions in the late 1960s and
early 1970s, U.S. sanctions were never implemented alongside foreign governments or
international organizations. Thus, we do not have sufficient instances of multilateral sanctions to
conclude about Hypothesis 2. Yet, we do know that the unilateral sanctions were often
circumvented because Cuba had economic opportunities elsewhere. Thus, the reverse of this
hypothesis might be confirmed. The fact that U.S. sanctions were almost always unilateral is
perhaps one reason why U.S. sanctions were rarely able to induce economic suffering in Cuba,
and thus, why they failed to liberalize the Castro regime. From the onset of economic sanctions
in the early 1960s Cuba has been able to redirect trade and investment lost from the embargo to
Latin American and European states. During the 60s, 70s, and until the late 80s, trade and
significant financial aid flows came from the socialist bloc in Eastern Europe, and from the
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Soviet Union. In the late 1990s and in the 21st century, Cuba increased economic relationships
with Europe, Latin America, and in particular, Venezuela. These relationships kept Cuba afloat
and offset the potential political and economic hardship caused by U.S. sanctions.
A separate but related observation is that Cuba is highly susceptible to political and
economic pressures from states and organizations outside of the United States. Prior to economic
meetings with the Spanish government and several Latin American countries, Cuba released
several dozen political prisoners and strengthened religious freedoms. The Chinese government
recently has been influential in promoting economic reforms on the island. Throughout history
the Vatican has been successful in encouraging the release of political prisoners. After persistent
pressure from the United Nations and the UNHRC, Havana authorized a UNHRC representative
to visit the island. Thus, U.S. economic sanctions implemented with the political support of other
countries likely would have produced greater pressure for liberalization in Cuba.

Democratic Exposure

Hypothesis 3: if exposure to democratic ideas increases in an autocratic regime, through
academic exchange, migration, or exposure to Western Media, then pressures for liberalization
will increase and a regime will liberalize (Levinsky and Way 2005; Nye 2004; Perez-Armendariz
and Crow 2010; Parta 2007).

Results for hypothesis 3 are mixed. While it is clear that some democratic exposure
factors tend to result in Cuba liberalizing, other factors display less significance. High-level
diplomatic engagement appears to be particularly effective. Most indicative of this was President
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Carter’s successful talks with Cuba in 1978 that resulted in the release of thousands of political
prisoners. The detrimental effects of President Reagan’s often isolationist policies offer a counter
example. Reagan’s negotiations in 1984, however, resulted in the signing of an agreement on
migration and the release of 30,000 political refugees.
Migration’s relationship with liberalization seems to be murky. Rather than serving as a
tool to spread democratic ideology abroad, as scholars predict, migration appears to have been a
helpful mechanism to rid the island of opposition factions, thereby improving majority support
for Castro on the island and limiting the likelihood of liberalization. Moreover, exiles have been
only recently permitted to travel to the island unrestricted. As these person-to-person exchanges
continue over time it will be clearer if migration supports liberalization in Cuba.
Pro-democracy media outlets utilized by the Reagan and Bush senior administrations
were ultimately failures due to Cuba’s ability to block their signals, and because they did not
sufficiently introduce democratic principles to Cubans. In turn, Barack Obama’s efforts to talk
with a more reform-minded government led by Raul Castro were associated with a new partial
liberalization in Cuba. Following the reestablishment of diplomatic relations between Cuba and
the United States, Raul Castro allowed to release several dozen political prisoners as an
extension of the economic and political changes discussed earlier in this paper. It remains to be
seen whether an upswing in U.S. citizens’ visits to Cuba will set into motion a deepening of the
liberalization underway or not.

Domestic Economic Conditions
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Hypothesis 4: if economic conditions are poor, then an autocratic regime will face more
pressure for change and liberalize (Lipset 1959; Acemoglu, Robinson, and Yared 2005)

Results for Hypothesis 4 are mixed. In many instances it is hard to determine if poor
economic conditions contributed to liberalization because often times economic pressures in
Cuba were low. During the mid 1960s and throughout the 1970s, for example, Cuba’s economy
grew throughout. It also benefited from strong economic support from the Soviet Union. Yet
during this period Cuba increased respect for political dissidents slightly.
In a few instances where economic conditions were poor, the Cuban regime actually
reversed liberalizations. As scholars predict, poor economic conditions have led to the rise of
internal discontent in Cuba. However, in contradiction to their theories is that Cuba seemed to
heighten repression facing these factions, rather than acquiesce. This was particularly evident
during the collapse of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and in the early 2000s
when Cuban exports declined and the tourism sector suffered.
Economic conditions in the early 1990s provide the strongest evidence for supporting
hypothesis 4. As internal pressures grew Havana was forced to implement a series of economic
liberalizing reforms. Although liberalizations in the past decade have been, in part, due to the
new leader being reform-minded, they are also a result of pressure from flattening growth.
However, in the early 1990s economic reforms were coincided with heightened political
repression.
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Conclusion

This project has provided a brief review of U.S. policies toward Cuba from 1966 to
present. It has also identified trends and fluctuations in the conditions of civil liberties in Cuba
over that time period. In comparing these two variables it has sought to determine how
successful the United States has been in encouraging liberalization in the Cuban regime. This
analysis highlights that, despite successful instances of cooperation and diplomatic engagement,
the United States has failed overall in its attempt to liberalize Cuba.
This paper reveals that U.S. sanctions policy, although detrimental to the Cuban economy
at times, has not led to reform on the island. Rather the embargo has strengthened the Cuban
regime against the country’s opposition. In response to economic sanctions both Castros have
highlighted U.S. aggression toward Cuba and confounded existing anti-American sentiments on
the island. This was particularly apparent in the aftermath of the Helms-Burton Law and the
Cuban Democracy Act. On a few occasions where the embargo was strengthened, as in the early
1990s, sanctions may have contributed to the repression of political opposition groups.
Conversely, Cuba displayed a willingness to modernize when the United States reduced
economic restrictions. This is evidenced by Carter’s relaxation of sanctions that resulted in
diplomatic discussions between the two countries, and in the release of several thousands of
political prisoners.
It is also apparent that the embargo has failed because it is extremely unilateral. No other
country has implemented sanctions toward Cuba since the mid 1970s and U.S. efforts to gain
international support for the embargo were unsuccessful. In recent times the U.S. embargo has
become extremely unpopular, and international support for the Cuban regime has grown. In
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attempting to isolate Cuba economically, the United States has isolated itself politically. This is
evidenced by the series of recent UN resolutions condemning the United States for its economic
policy toward the island. Moreover, the importance of international support is evidenced by other
countries’ success in promoting freedom and change in Cuba. China has been particularly
influential in promoting economic reforms on the island. Latin American states successfully have
encouraged political openness in Cuba. Talks with the Vatican were particularly beneficial.
Working alongside these countries who have friendlier relations with Cuba would likely benefit
the United States in its foreign policy goals in Cuba.
Another significant implication of this paper is that high levels of diplomatic cooperation
can be helpful in promoting liberalization. Both the Carter and Obama administrations were
successful in reducing the level of long-term imprisonment on the island through diplomatic
discussions. Reagan’s negotiations in 1984 resulted in the release of 30,000 political refugees
(Perez-Stable 2011, 15). Recent diplomatic efforts by the Obama administration have supported
the growing Cuban private sector and spread the access to Internet on the island.
Although supported in existing literature, this paper cannot determine if democratic
exposure techniques such as migration, exposure to Western media, or academic exchanges
promote liberalization in an autocratic regime. Rather than serving as a tool to spread democratic
ideology abroad migration appears to have been a helpful mechanism to rid the island of
opposition factions, thereby improving majority support for Castro on the island and limiting the
likelihood of liberalization. Moreover, exiles have been only recently permitted to travel to the
island. As these person-to-person exchanges continue over time it will be clearer if migration
supports liberalization in Cuba.
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In particular we find little evidence to support or deny the notion that access to Western
media might lead to liberalization in an autocratic regime. Although programs such as Radio and
T.V. Martí were funded heavily by the United States they failed to reach Cuban audiences. Since
Cubans did not have access to Western media it would be impossible to say whether such
democratic exposure contributed to liberalization or not. Academic exchanges were limited
throughout the history of the U.S.-Cuba relationship.
An additional finding, yet one that is unrelated to the hypotheses listed in this project, is
that the goals of foreign policy matter in promoting liberalization. Those goals that are less
ambitious are more likely to result in liberalization. For example, whereas President Carter
sought to promote human rights in Cuba, President Reagan demanded a full fledge democratic
system be implemented. As evidenced by our discussion on both administrations, Carter was
more successful in encouraging liberalization in Cuba. This is in accordance with scholarly
contributions from Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliot (1986).

Limitations and Recommendations for Future Study
One major shortcoming of this paper is the limited data on civil liberties in Cuba during
the early periods discussed. As the Freedom in the World report has progressed over time, its
reports have become more in depth and thorough. As mentioned in the methods section of this
paper, the reports began as short summaries written by a single individual and a few assistants.
Today several dozen experts collaborate on each report. Moreover, other sources of information
regarding civil liberties in Cuba during the 1960s are scant. This is reflected in the noticeable
differences in length between this paper’s discussion of civil liberties in the first and last case
studies.
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Another potential flaw is that this study is limited in the variables considered. Although
this thesis reviews how sanctions, democratic exposure, and internal economic factors might
affect liberalization trends in Cuba, there are surely a variety of other potentially liberalizing
factors. For example, internal political factors likely contribute to a regimes tendency to
liberalize or not. Although this paper makes mention of this variable throughout, it might have
benefited from treating that variable as a single unique factor. International and regional trends
are likely influential in promoting or deterring liberalization as well. Given time constraints and
limited access to information, this study was unable to cover these factors. Future studies might
offer more insight about such variables and their relationship with liberalization.
Future studies might seek to narrow the time frames considered. An alternate approach to
looking at time periods of ten or more years might be to examine the policies of particular U.S.
administrations. This would provide a more thorough and rigorous discussion of the differences
and varying levels of success of U.S. presidents.

Implications
Despite the recent liberalizations initiated under Raul Castro, Cuba remains a totalitarian
and repressive society. The independent press remains illegal, although some state media is able
to discuss corruption and other previously illegal topics. Access to the Internet is tightly
controlled. According to Freedom House the estimated Internet penetration rate is 5 percent and
access to the state-sponsored Internet cafes is extremely expensive. Religious freedom remains
strained. Although long-term detentions are less common today, short-term detentions and
harassment have replaced them. Such short-term imprisonments were particularly common
during major political events, including the visit of the Pope in March 2012 and the International
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Human Rights Day in December 2013. According to the Cuban Commission for Human Rights
and National Reconciliation in 2012 there was an estimated 6,602 short-term detentions and in
2014 that number reached a record 8,899 (“Freedom in the World Report: Cuba” 2013).
Continued efforts should be taken to promote freedom and openness in Cuba.
Thus, more liberalization in Cuba is needed and efforts to promote openness should
continue. At the time of this paper’s writing it does not seem likely that Obama will renege on
his efforts to engage the Cuban government, nor will he likely reverse efforts to end the
embargo. In the midst of this papers writing, in March 2016, President Obama became the first
active president to visit the island in over 70 years. Continued efforts toward normalization are
likely. However, it is unclear what the policy of Obama’s successor might be.
Obama’s ongoing negotiations with the Cuban government are a step in the right
direction. Those discussions have already resulted in the release of dozens of political prisoners
and continued economic openness. The next administration ought to continue building ties with
the Cuban regime to encourage liberalization and eventual democratization. In particular, the
United States should continue to adapt its economic policies to align itself with the majority of
countries and regions that treat Cuba with economic fairness. The economic embargo toward
Cuba does not promote liberalization on the island, nor does it receive support from international
organizations or foreign countries. Moreover, the U.S.-Cuba relationship is extremely
tumultuous; engaging with other countries whose relations with Cuba are historically positive or
neutral might be wise. Cooperating with the Vatican through diplomatic negotiations has been
particularly beneficial. Through cooperation, mutual respect, and compromise the United States
will be best equipped to promote liberalization and openness in Cuba.
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